UC-8100A-ME-T System Image: Versions v1.0 to v1.6, UC-2100 System Image: Versions v1.0 to v1.12, UC-2100-W System Image: Versions v1.0 to v 1.12, UC-3100 System Image: Versions v1.0 to v1.6, UC-5100 System Image: Versions v1.0 to v1.4, UC-8100 System Image: Versions v3.0 to v3.5, UC-8100-ME-T System Image: Versions v3.0 and v3.1, UC-8200 System Image: v1.0 to v1.5, AIG-300 System Image: v1.0 to v1.4, UC-8410A with Debian 9 System Image: Versions v4.0.2 and v4.1.2, UC-8580 with Debian 9 System Image: Versions v2.0 and v2.1, UC-8540 with Debian 9 System Image: Versions v2.0 and v2.1, and DA-662C-16-LX (GLB) System Image: Versions v1.0.2 to v1.1.2 of Moxa's ARM-based computers have an execution with unnecessary privileges vulnerability, which could allow an attacker with user-level privileges to gain root privileges.

Cradlepoint IBR600 NCOS versions 6.5.0.160bc2e and prior are vulnerable to shell escape, which enables local attackers with non-superuser credentials to gain full, unrestrictive shell access which may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

An attacker with physical access to the affected Moxa UC Series devices can initiate a restart of the device and gain access to its BIOS. Command line options can then be altered, allowing the attacker to access the terminal. From the terminal, the attacker can modify the device’s authentication files to create a new user and gain full access to the system.

A physical attack vulnerability exists in certain Moxa industrial computers using TPM-backed LUKS full-disk encryption on Moxa Industrial Linux 3, where the discrete TPM is connected to the CPU via an SPI bus. Exploitation requires invasive physical access, including opening the device and attaching external equipment to the SPI bus to capture TPM communications. If successful, the captured data may allow offline decryption of eMMC contents. This attack cannot be performed through brief or opportunistic physical access and requires extended physical access, possession of the device, appropriate equipment, and sufficient time for signal capture and analysis. Remote exploitation is not possible.

Moxa Arm-based industrial computers running Moxa Industrial Linux Secure use a device-unique bootloader password provided on the device. An attacker with physical access to the device could use this information to access the bootloader menu via a serial interface.  Access to the bootloader menu does not allow full system takeover or privilege escalation. The bootloader enforces digital signature verification and only permits flashing of Moxa-signed images. As a result, an attacker cannot install malicious firmware or execute arbitrary code. The primary impact is limited to a potential temporary denial-of-service condition if a valid image is reflashed. Remote exploitation is not possible.