Impact An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code Node could escape the sandbox and achieve arbitrary code execution on the task runner container.
This issue only affects instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled.
Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.48, 2.21.8, and 2.22.4. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Python Code node by adding n8n-nodes-base.code to the NODESEXCLUDE environment variable, or disable the Python Task Runner entirely.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
Impact An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could supply a local filesystem path as the source repository in the Git node's Clone operation, or as the target repository in the Push operation, bypassing the N8NRESTRICTFILEACCESSTO file sandbox. This allowed the contents of any local git repository accessible to the n8n process to be cloned into an allowed path and read, circumventing the access restrictions that correctly blocked direct file reads to the same paths.
Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.48, 2.21.8, and 2.22.4. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODESEXCLUDE environment variable.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.