Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.

Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow.

https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114

Impact If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat. Repeating a nonce with AES-GCM results in both confidentiality and integrity compromise of data encrypted with the associated key.

In codecov (npm package) before version 3.7.1 the upload method has a command injection vulnerability. Clients of the codecov-node library are unlikely to be aware of this, so they might unwittingly write code that contains a vulnerability. A similar CVE (CVE-2020-7597 for GHSA-5q88-cjfq-g2mh) was issued but the fix was incomplete. It only blocked &, and command injection is still possible using backticks instead to bypass the sanitizer. The attack surface is low in this case. Particularly in the standard use of codecov, where the module is used directly in a build pipeline, not built against as a library in another application that may supply malicious input and perform command injection.