Summary

IPIPANCorpusReader (nltk/corpus/reader/ipipan.py) exposes public methods, channels(), domains(), categories(), and fileids(channels=...), that accept a caller supplied fileids list and read a file via a completely unprotected builtin open() call, with no nltk.pathsec involvement at all. A symlink placed inside the corpus root, with a name containing no separators or .., passes NLTK's existing traversal checks and is opened directly, reading a file from anywhere on the filesystem the process can access.

Root cause

All four methods route through gettag():

python def gettag(self, f, tag): tags = [] with open(f) as infile: # builtin open(), no pathsec involvement header = infile.read() ...

f arrives via listheaderfiles() / listmorphfilesby(), both of which call:

python f.replace("morph.xml", "header.xml")

on the result of self.abspath(...) or self.abspaths(...). FileSystemPathPointer subclasses str, so .replace() returns a plain Python string, silently discarding the PathPointer wrapper. That plain string is handed straight to builtin open().

This is a more severe variant of the same CWE-59 class already fixed elsewhere in this codebase (CorpusReader.open(), NKJPCorpusReader.addroot(), and the recent FramenetCorpusReader fix): those route file access through nltk.pathsec.validatepath(), at minimum the global, non-scoped check, before opening. Here, converting the PathPointer to a plain string before calling open() skips pathsec completely, not just the corpus-root-scoped check, so the symlink target does not even need to land under a registered nltk.data.path root.

Plain literal ../ traversal in the fileid is still blocked by FileSystemPathPointer.join(), so this is specifically the symlink variant, not a regression of the older, simpler traversal class.

Proof of concept

Constructed the normal, documented way, fileids as a regex over file paths, so the reader auto-discovers whatever .xml files exist in its root with no special knowledge of the planted symlink.

python import os import tempfile

from nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan import IPIPANCorpusReader

root = tempfile.mkdtemp() corpusroot = os.path.join(root, "ipipan") os.makedirs(corpusroot)

with open(os.path.join(corpusroot, "realmorph.xml"), "w") as f: f.write("<channel>legit</channel>")

secretdir = os.path.join(root, "outsideipipanroot") os.makedirs(secretdir) secretpath = os.path.join(secretdir, "stolen.xml") with open(secretpath, "w") as f: f.write("<channel>TOP-SECRET-CHANNEL-DATA-FROM-OUTSIDE-CORPUS-ROOT</channel>")

os.symlink(secretpath, os.path.join(corpusroot, "evillink.xml"))

reader = IPIPANCorpusReader(corpusroot, r".\.xml") print("Auto-discovered fileids:", sorted(reader.fileids()))

result = reader.channels(fileids=["evillink.xml"]) print(result)

Actual output when run against current develop:

Auto-discovered fileids: ['evillink.xml', 'realmorph.xml'] ['TOP-SECRET-CHANNEL-DATA-FROM-OUTSIDE-CORPUS-ROOT']

That content was read from secretpath, a file entirely outside corpusroot. No exception raised anywhere. The planted symlink even surfaces naturally in the reader's own fileids() listing, exactly as a real file would.

Verified separately that literal ../ traversal in the fileid is still rejected (ValueError: Traversal blocked), confirming this is specifically the symlink gap, not a broader regression.

Why this is in scope

- No malicious file for a victim to open, no special user interaction. Just a tampered or shared corpus directory (SECURITY.md names "shared environments... multi-tenant pipelines" as the project's own stated threat model) plus a completely normal API call. - Core corpus-reader code, reached through plain import nltk and documented, programmatic usage (words(), sents(), channels(), etc.), not a demo or GUI tool. - Same reader category, and same CWE-59 mechanism, already treated as CVE-worthy twice in this codebase for FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader. - Not a bypass of a claimed fix. ipipan.py has never had security hardening applied, and has no dedicated test coverage at all.

CVSS v3.1

- AV:L, AC:L: exploitation is local filesystem symlink placement, then immediate and deterministic once triggered. - PR:L: the attacker needs some pre-existing ability to plant a symlink somewhere reachable, not zero privilege, but not elevated either. - UI:N: fires during routine, automated corpus processing, no separate victim action. - S:U: stays within the same process's existing privileges. - C:H, I:N, A:N: arbitrary file read only, no write, no crash.

Suggested fix

Route gettag() through nltk.pathsec.validatepath() with the corpus root as requiredroot, or through CorpusReader.open(), instead of converting the PathPointer to a plain string and calling builtin open() directly. The same fix pattern already applied to FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader applies directly here.

NLTK versions before 3.10.2 contain a symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader that allows attackers to read arbitrary XML files outside the corpus root. Attackers can place symlinks with names containing no path separators inside the corpus subdirectory, which pass the path validation guard and are resolved to files outside the intended corpus root when accessed via framebyname(), lufile(), or doc() methods.