Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to 3.22.1, Schema.TemplateLiteral schemas containing at least two Schema.String spans compile each span to the ambiguous lazy wildcard [\s\S]?. Decoding a non-matching untrusted string causes cubic regular expression backtracking, which can block the JavaScript event loop. The issue affects Schema.decodeUnknown, Schema.decodeUnknownSync, Schema.is, and consumers such as HttpApi and @effect/rpc payload decoding. This issue is fixed in version 3.22.1.
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to 3.22.1, Schema.TemplateLiteral schemas containing at least two Schema.String spans compile each span to the ambiguous lazy wildcard [\s\S]?. Decoding a non-matching untrusted string causes cubic regular expression backtracking, which can block the JavaScript event loop. The issue affects Schema.decodeUnknown, Schema.decodeUnknownSync, Schema.is, and consumers such as HttpApi and @effect/rpc payload decoding. This issue is fixed in version 3.22.1.
Impact
The name, domain, and path fields of makeCookie() were validated with a regex that allows ;, the attribute separator in Set-Cookie headers. Because serializeCookie() writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.
For example, a domain of "legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld" serializes to session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets SameSite=None or Max-Age when the caller has not set those options itself.
The value field is unaffected: it passes through encodeURIComponent, which encodes ;. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.
Patches
Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject ;, and serializeCookie() now validates before writing the header.
Workarounds
Do not pass user input into name, domain, or path; set them from application constants.
Impact
The name, domain, and path fields of makeCookie() were validated with a regex that allows ;, the attribute separator in Set-Cookie headers. Because serializeCookie() writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.
For example, a domain of "legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld" serializes to session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets SameSite=None or Max-Age when the caller has not set those options itself.
The value field is unaffected: it passes through encodeURIComponent, which encodes ;. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.
Patches
Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject ;, and serializeCookie() now validates before writing the header.
Workarounds
Do not pass user input into name, domain, or path; set them from application constants.