Impact The runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation:

javascript const file = widget-${widgetId}.js const widget = require(path.join(dirname, file))

Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise.

Patches

Fixed in version >= 3.7.16

Workarounds Until a patch is released: - Do not install or run untrusted plugins. - Avoid loading arbitrary web content inside electerm’s embedded webview (for example, disable any features that fetch and display remote HTML). - Run electerm in a sandboxed environment (e.g., with bubblewrap on Linux, AppArmor/SELinux profiles, or Windows sandboxed app execution) to limit the impact of any code execution.

Resources - electerm GitHub Repository - electerm Security Policy - Vulnerability details originally reported by external researcher (PoC confirmed on v3.7.9, Win10).

electerm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.3.8, a command injection vulnerability exists in github.com/elcterm/electerm/npm/install.js:150. The runMac() function appends attacker-controlled remote releaseInfo.name directly into an exec("open ...") command without validation. This issue has been patched in version 3.3.8.

Impact

Electerm's terminal hyperlink handler passes any URL clicked in the terminal directly to shell.openExternal without any protocol validation.

When a user connects to a malicious SSH server, the attacker can print a crafted URI in the terminal output. If the victim clicks the link, shell.openExternal executes it using the operating system's default protocol handler.

This can be abused to: - Trigger dangerous protocol handlers (ms-msdt:, search-ms:) for code execution - Open local files or network shares (file://, UNC paths) to leak NTLM hashes or exfiltrate data - Launch any installed application associated with a custom URI scheme

An attacker who controls terminal output (e.g., via a malicious SSH server, compromised remote host, or malicious plugin rendering terminal content) can thus achieve arbitrary code execution or local file access on the victim's machine, requiring only that the victim clicks a displayed link.

Patches

As of electerm v3.7.9, no official patch has been released. Users should monitor the project’s GitHub releases and security page for an update addressing this issue.

Workarounds

Until a patch is available: - Do not click on any links displayed in terminal sessions connected to untrusted servers. - If possible, disable hyperlink rendering in electerm's terminal settings. - Use a terminal multiplexer (e.g., tmux) or a separate terminal application that filters URI schemes when working with untrusted hosts. - Consider running electerm in a restricted environment (sandbox, AppArmor, SELinux) that limits the spawning of protocol handlers.

Resources

- electerm GitHub Repository - electerm Security Policy - Vulnerability details originally reported by external researcher (confirmed on v3.7.9, Win10).

Impact Arbitrary local code execution via deep links, CLI --opts, or crafted shortcuts. Affected users: electerm installs that accept protocol URLs or CLI options (affected versions listed in the original report). Exploit requires clicking a crafted electerm://... link or opening a crafted shortcut/command that launches electerm with attacker-controlled opts.

Patches Fixed in version > 3.8.8

Commits:

- https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/8a6a17951e96d715f5a231532bbd8303fe208700 - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/a79e06f4a1f0ac6376c3d2411ef4690fa0377742

Workarounds - Disable or unregister electerm protocol handlers (Deep Link settings) and avoid clicking electerm:// links. - Do not run electerm with untrusted --opts arguments or open .lnk / .desktop files from untrusted sources. - Restrict which users can launch electerm on shared machines and avoid leaving electerm installed in locations reachable by other users. - As a temporary measure, run electerm in a confined account or sandbox (non-admin user) to reduce impact.

Resources - Report / credit: https://github.com/Curly-Haired-Baboon - Electerm releases: https://github.com/electerm/electerm/releases

Impact

A code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in electerm's SFTP open with system editor or "Edit with custom editor" feature. When a user opts to edit a file using open with system editor or open with a custom editor, the filename is passed directly into a command line without sanitization.

A malicious actor controlling the SSH server or user OS can exploit this by crafting a filename containing shell metacharacters. If a victim subsequently attempts to edit this file, the injected commands are executed on their machine with the user's privileges. This could allow the attacker to run arbitrary code, install malware, or move laterally within the network.

<img width="1792" height="817" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ddf78890-e95d-4fe7-981e-f86887677e8b" /> <img width="1648" height="941" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cca2295b-2053-4d99-a464-be51eac2f5be" />

Patches

Fixed in version >= 3.7.9

- https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/24ce7103e264cffe6eb5476c0506a2379e6f8333

Workarounds

Until a patch is available, it is strongly recommended to: - Refrain from using the open with system editor or "Edit with custom editor" feature when connected to untrusted or unfamiliar SSH servers. - Consider using the built-in editor for viewing files, as this path may not be vulnerable to the same injection. - If the feature must be used, ensure connections are exclusively established with trusted servers and perform rigorous filename validation before editing.

Resources

- electerm GitHub Repository

Impact

The getConstants() IPC handler in src/app/lib/ipc-sync.js serialises the entire process.env object and sends it to the renderer. The data is stored as window.pre.env and is accessible from any JavaScript running in the renderer (e.g., via the DevTools console or a compromised webview context).

On developer and CI machines, process.env routinely contains secrets such as:

- AWSSECRETACCESSKEY / AWSSESSIONTOKEN - GITHUBTOKEN / NPMTOKEN - OPENAIAPIKEY / DOCKERAUTH - Internal service credentials, API keys, and database URLs

An attacker who achieves any JavaScript execution within the renderer—for example, through a malicious plugin, a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw, or the terminal hyperlink execution chain—can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to a remote server, leading to cloud account compromise, supply chain attacks, and lateral movement. The exposure is visible even without any code execution by simply opening the "Info" modal in the application, though that requires local access.

Patches

A patch is yet to be available.

Workarounds

Until a patch is released: - Avoid launching electerm with sensitive environment variables set. Use shell scripts or a dedicated terminal profile that clears secrets before starting the application. - Do not install plugins from untrusted sources, and audit any installed plugins for network access. - Keep the renderer context as locked down as possible: disable the remote debugging port, and do not paste untrusted code into the DevTools console.

Resources - electerm GitHub Repository - electerm Security Policy - Vulnerability details originally reported by external researcher (confirmed on v3.7.9, Win10).