Impact
fast-uri v3.1.1 and earlier decodes percent-encoded authority delimiters (%40 as @, %3A as :) inside the host component and serializes them back as raw characters. This changes the URI structure, turning a hostname into userinfo plus a different host.
For example, http://trusted.com%40evil.com/ normalizes to http://trusted.com@evil.com/, which reparses as host evil.com with userinfo trusted.com.
Applications that normalize untrusted URLs before host allowlist checks, redirect validation, or outbound request routing can be steered to a different authority than the original URL appeared to contain.
Patches
Upgrade to fast-uri >= 3.1.2.
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to the patched version.
fast-uri is a dependency-free RFC 3986 URI parser for Node.js, used by Fastify and ajv. In versions before 2.4.7, from 3.0.0 through 3.1.7, and from 4.0.0 through 4.1.4, fast-uri folds the host to lowercase before it percent-decodes the host, so a percent-encoded uppercase octet such as %41 decodes to a literal A that is never folded. For a scheme-relative reference such as //host there is no scheme, so the host canonicalization that would normally repair this does not run, and parse, normalize, and equal then disagree on the same host. An application that makes a case-sensitive host decision on fast-uri output, for example a host allowlist or denylist that compares the parsed host or uses equal, can be steered past the check with a percent-encoded uppercase octet, and because hostnames are case-insensitive in DNS and HTTP the evading spelling still reaches the host the check meant to gate. The issue is fixed in fast-uri 2.4.7, 3.1.8, and 4.1.5, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, compare hosts case-insensitively by lowercasing the parsed host before any allowlist or denylist decision.
fast-uri is a dependency-free RFC 3986 URI parser for Node.js, used by Fastify and ajv, that added a mailto scheme parser in version 4.1.3. In versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, the mailto parser compares each query field name to the reserved names to, subject, and body while the name is still percent-encoded, and decodes it only when storing it as a generic header, so a percent-encoded spelling of a reserved field name is not recognized as that field at parse time but is re-emitted as the literal field name when the parsed URI is serialized. An application that validates, logs, or displays the recipient list from the first parse and then serializes the URI and sends it can silently gain an attacker-chosen recipient, and the subject and body fields can be smuggled across the same roundtrip. The issue is fixed in fast-uri 4.1.5, and users should upgrade to 4.1.5 or later. As a workaround, do not act on a mailto URI that fast-uri has re-serialized without first decoding and re-validating its recipient, subject, and body fields.
fast-uri accepts a host that contains an unbalanced or misplaced authority bracket without reporting an error. A host that starts with an opening bracket but does not end with a closing bracket is neither validated as an IP literal nor canonicalized as a domain name, so parse() returns it as the host with error undefined, while Node's URL and the HTTP clients built on it resolve the same string to a different host. An application that reads the parsed host to make a host decision, such as an SSRF denylist, a redirect allowlist, or proxy routing, and then passes the original URL to an HTTP client evaluates its policy against a string that is not the host the request reaches. The same host is carried through normalize, equal, and resolve. This affects fast-uri versions 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3, and is fixed in 2.4.6, 3.1.7, and 4.1.4, where parse() reports a malformed host for any host that contains a bracket but is not a valid IPv6 literal.
Impact
fast-uri canonicalizes a host to its ASCII form only when the input carries an explicit scheme. When resolve() resolves a scheme-relative reference (//host/) against a scheme-bearing base, it still emits the host verbatim even though the effective scheme is known, so re-parsing the resolved URI yields a different host than the one resolve() returned. An application that resolves an untrusted reference with fast-uri and then checks or routes on the resulting host can make a policy decision on one host and reach another. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-13676, whose IDN canonicalization was applied only to the scheme-bearing form.
Patches
Upgrade to fast-uri 2.4.5, 3.1.6, or 4.1.3. resolve() now canonicalizes the host once the effective scheme is known, and fails closed if a raw non-ASCII host cannot be converted.
Workarounds
Resolve scheme-relative references against a base that carries a scheme before performing any host-policy or origin check.
Impact
fast-uri does not validate the complete RFC 3986 grammar for bracketed IPv6 literals, so a malformed literal with invalid trailing text is silently truncated to a different valid IPv6 address with no error reported. For example, normalize('http://[::not-valid]/private') returns http://[::]/private, and [fc00::not-hex] and [fe80::not-hex] collapse to [fc00::] and [fe80::]. An application that normalizes an untrusted URL before an outbound request, redirect, or host-policy check can be routed to a local or private address such as loopback (::1), unique-local, or link-local. Because parse().error is unset for these inputs, checking it does not protect the consumer.
Patches
Upgrade to fast-uri 2.4.5, 3.1.6, or 4.1.3. Malformed IPv6 literals are now rejected with a host error instead of being normalized to a valid address.
Workarounds
Reject untrusted URLs whose host is a bracketed IPv6 literal before passing them to fast-uri, or route outbound requests against an explicit allowlist of addresses rather than trusting the normalized host.
Impact
fast-uri decodes a hostname's percent escapes twice in a single normalize() or resolve() call: once during parsing and again during authority recomposition. A nested percent-encoded host therefore survives the first decode and is turned into a live destination by the second, so normalize('http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/') returns http://localhost/. Applications that normalize or resolve an untrusted URI before an SSRF check, redirect validation, or host allowlist can be steered to a different destination, including internal addresses such as loopback or a cloud metadata endpoint, than the encoded input appeared to contain. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2026-6322, whose encoded-authority-delimiter fix introduced the second decode.
Patches
Fixed in fast-uri 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3.
Workarounds
Reject untrusted URIs whose host component contains an encoded percent sign (%25) before passing them to normalize() or resolve().
Impact
fast-uri v4.1.0 and earlier do not treat a literal backslash (U+005C) as an authority delimiter. Node's native WHATWG URL (used by fetch(), undici, and Node's http/https clients) normalizes \ to / for special schemes (http, https, ws, wss, ftp, file), so the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input string.
For example, http://evil.com\@allowed.com is treated by fast-uri as host allowed.com with userinfo evil.com\, while Node's WHATWG URL parser and fetch() see host evil.com with path /@allowed.com.
Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host-based policy (allowlists, denylists, loopback/SSRF filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) before passing the same URL into Node's URL or fetch() consumers see a policy/use desync and can be steered to an unintended destination, including cloud metadata endpoints, loopback, or internal hosts.
Patches
Upgrade to fast-uri v4.1.1, v3.1.4, or v2.4.3.
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to the patched version.