Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
EPSS
0.05%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process.

Impact

Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that passes untrusted input to flatted.parse() can be crashed by an unauthenticated attacker with a single request.

flatted has ~87M weekly npm downloads and is used as the circular-JSON serialization layer in many caching and logging libraries.

Proof of Concept

javascript const flatted = require('flatted');

// Build deeply nested circular reference chain const depth = 20000; const arr = new Array(depth + 1); arr[0] = '{"a":"1"}'; for (let i = 1; i <= depth; i++) { arr[i] = {"a":"${i + 1}"}; } arr[depth] = '{"a":"leaf"}';

const payload = JSON.stringify(arr); flatted.parse(payload); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

Fix

The maintainer has already merged an iterative (non-recursive) implementation in PR #88, converting the recursive revive() to a stack-based loop.

Affected Versions

All versions prior to the PR #88 fix.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
7

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.

First published (updated )

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to version 3.4.2, the parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "proto" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.2.

First published (updated )

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