Summary
flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process.
Impact
Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that passes untrusted input to flatted.parse() can be crashed by an unauthenticated attacker with a single request.
flatted has ~87M weekly npm downloads and is used as the circular-JSON serialization layer in many caching and logging libraries.
Proof of Concept
javascript const flatted = require('flatted');
// Build deeply nested circular reference chain const depth = 20000; const arr = new Array(depth + 1); arr[0] = '{"a":"1"}'; for (let i = 1; i <= depth; i++) { arr[i] = {"a":"${i + 1}"}; } arr[depth] = '{"a":"leaf"}';
const payload = JSON.stringify(arr); flatted.parse(payload); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
Fix
The maintainer has already merged an iterative (non-recursive) implementation in PR #88, converting the recursive revive() to a stack-based loop.
Affected Versions
All versions prior to the PR #88 fix.
flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.
flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to version 3.4.2, the parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "proto" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.2.