Flowise (packages flowise and flowise-components) in versions <= 3.1.2 contain a sandbox escape in the vm2/@flowiseai/nodevm JavaScript sandbox. An authenticated user with access to the /api/v1/node-custom-function endpoint can escape the sandbox by supplying attacker-controlled executablePath and args parameters to puppeteer.launch(), which internally invokes childprocess.spawn() outside the sandbox boundary. This allows execution of arbitrary OS commands as the Flowise process user (root in the official Docker image) and arbitrary host file disclosure via Chromium's file:// URL handling. In versions 3.0.8–3.1.2 exploitation requires ALLOWBUILTINDEP=true; earlier versions are exploitable by default. Fixed in 3.1.3.

Flowise (npm packages flowise and flowise-components) through 3.1.4 looks up credentials by ID without filtering on the requesting user's workspace (findOneBy({ id: credentialId }) with no workspaceId condition) in several code paths: getAllOpenaiAssistants/getSingleOpenaiAssistant (GET /api/v1/openai-assistants and /api/v1/openai-assistants/:id), uploadFilesToAssistant (POST /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/upload/), deleteAssistant (DELETE /api/v1/assistants/:id, reachable by first importing a poisoned assistant row via POST /api/v1/export-import/import), and the shared helper used by getVoices (GET /api/v1/text-to-speech/voices). An authenticated user of one workspace can supply a credential UUID belonging to another workspace, causing the server to decrypt and use that workspace's OpenAI or ElevenLabs API key on the attacker's behalf. No patched version was available at the time of publication.