Impact

User control of the first argument of the addImage method results in denial of service.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image data or URLs to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful GIF file that results in out of memory errors and denial of service. Harmful GIF files have large width and/or height entries in their headers, wich lead to excessive memory allocation.

Other affected methods are: html.

Example attack vector:

js import { jsPDF } from "jspdf"

// malicious GIF image data with large width/height headers const payload = ...

const doc = new jsPDF();

doc.addImage(payload, "GIF", 0, 0, 100, 100);

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF 4.1.1. Upgrade to jspdf@>=4.2.0.

Workarounds

Sanitize image data or URLs before passing it to the addImage method or one of the other affected methods. References https://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-25535.md

Impact

User control of the argument of the addJS method allows an attacker to inject arbitrary PDF objects into the generated document. By crafting a payload that escapes the JavaScript string delimiter, an attacker can execute malicious actions or alter the document structure, impacting any user who opens the generated PDF.

js import { jsPDF } from "jspdf"; const doc = new jsPDF(); // Payload: // 1. ) closes the JS string. // 2. > closes the current dictionary. // 3. /AA ... injects an "Additional Action" that executes on focus/open. const maliciousPayload = "console.log('test');) >> /AA << /O << /S /JavaScript /JS (app.alert('Hacked!')) >> >>";

doc.addJS(maliciousPayload); doc.save("vulnerable.pdf");

Patches The vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.2.0.

Workarounds Escape parentheses in user-provided JavaScript code before passing them to the addJS method. References https://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-25755.md

Impact

User control of properties and methods of the Acroform module allows users to inject arbitrary PDF objects, such as JavaScript actions.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized input to one of the following property, a user can inject arbitrary PDF objects, such as JavaScript actions, which are executed when the victim hovers over the radio option.

AcroformChildClass.appearanceState

Example attack vector:

js import { jsPDF } from "jspdf" const doc = new jsPDF();

const group = new doc.AcroFormRadioButton(); group.x = 10; group.y = 10; group.width = 20; group.height = 10; doc.addField(group);

const child = group.createOption("opt1"); child.x = 10; child.y = 10; child.width = 20; child.height = 10; child.appearanceState = "Off /AA << /E << /S /JavaScript /JS (app.alert('XSS')) >> >>";

doc.save("test.pdf");

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.2.0.

Workarounds Sanitize user input before passing it to the vulnerable API members.