Impact
Morgan writes attacker-controlled request data to the access log through its tokens. The 1.11.0 fix neutralizes C0 control characters, DEL, and backslash, but it does not escape the Unicode line separators U+0085 (NEL), U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR), or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR). These code points are reachable through several tokens, including the request URL (:url), request headers such as :user-agent and :referrer, arbitrary :req[header] values, and the Basic auth username (:remote-user). NEL is valid obs-text in HTTP header values, so an attacker can place it in an ordinary request header.
When such a value is logged, the raw code points survive into the emitted access-log record, and downstream ECMAScript-aware or Unicode-aware log processing splits the single physical record into multiple logical records. This allows an attacker to forge log entries. The built-in combined, common, default, and short formats are affected, as well as any custom format. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-5078.
Patches
Users should upgrade to version 1.12.0.
Workarounds
None. The affected values include the request URL and request headers, which are core to access logging, so there is no practical format-based mitigation. Upgrade to 1.12.0.
Impact
Morgan writes attacker-controlled request data to the access log. Its escaping (added in 1.11.0 and 1.12.0) neutralizes control characters, the Unicode line separators, and backslash, but not the double quote (0x22), which is the field delimiter of the Apache combined log format morgan emits. An attacker who controls a quoted field (:user-agent, :referrer, the request URL, or the Basic auth :remote-user) can inject a double quote to close the field early and forge additional fields in the log record. The combined, common, and default formats, and any custom format that quotes a token, are affected. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-5078 and CVE-2026-15603.
Patches
Users should upgrade to version 1.12.1.
Workarounds
Update to version 1.12.1.
Impact
Morgan's :remote-user token extracts the Basic auth username from the Authorization header and writes it to the log stream without neutralizing control characters. An attacker can send a crafted Authorization: Basic header containing CR/LF characters to inject forged log lines, corrupting the one-request-per-line structure of access logs.
The built-in combined, common, default, and short formats are affected, as well as any custom format that includes :remote-user.
Patches
Users should upgrade to version 1.11.0.
Workarounds
Use a custom format string that does not include :remote-user.