Summary
Orval's zod schema generation emits the enum-typed default value as a module-level template literal (export const …Default = <default>;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Details
ts export const …Default = v${globalThis.ORVPWN()}w; // ${...} = arbitrary JS expression, runs at import
Malicious input: an enum-typed property with a default of v${<attacker JS>}w. ${...} permits any JS expression.
Note: this is one of several default-bearing positions that reach the same unescaped zod template-literal sink; a single fix (escape default values) closes all of them, and a CNA may choose to consolidate the related reports.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ makespec.py) attached: generates the zod schema with default validation, bundles it, imports it, and shows a marker written at import. Verified on 8.19.0.
Impact
Code execution at import in any application that imports a zod schema module generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description.
Suggested fix
Emit default values via a proper string-literal encoder (JSON.stringify, or escape backtick and ${ if a template literal must be used); never interpolate a spec value into a template literal. Apply to every default position.
Summary
Orval's zod schema generation emits the header-parameter default value as a module-level template literal (export const Default = <default>;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Details
ts export const …Default = v${globalThis.ORVPWN()}w; // ${...} = arbitrary JS expression, runs at import
Malicious input: a header parameter with a default of v${<attacker JS>}w. ${...} permits any JS expression.
Note: this is one of several default-bearing positions that reach the same unescaped zod template-literal sink; a single fix (escape default values) closes all of them, and a CNA may choose to consolidate the related reports.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ makespec.py) attached: generates the zod schema with default validation, bundles it, imports it, and shows a marker written at import. Verified on 8.19.0.
Impact
Code execution at import in any application that imports a zod schema module generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description.
Suggested fix
Emit default values via a proper string-literal encoder (JSON.stringify, or escape backtick and ${ if a template literal must be used); never interpolate a spec value into a template literal. Apply to every default position. makespec.py reproduce.sh
Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. The described memory use only grows in proportion to input already allocated by JSON.parse before Zod runs, is reachable only without an application request-size limit, and reflects expected validator behavior rather than a defect in Zod.
Zod schema-validation library contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows attackers to exhaust memory by submitting a large array, set or map to an application that uses a container schema without an explicit size constraint. The handleArrayResult parse logic in $ZodArray (and the equivalent set and map paths) accumulates every validation issue for each failing element with no cap or early termination, causing the process to allocate one issue object per element and crash under out-of-memory conditions. This is reachable in the default configuration whenever a container schema such as z.array() is declared without a size bound. The upstream change in commit e06a510 (pull request 6652, first released in 4.6.6) only moves the .max(), .length() and .size() size checks to run before element parsing, so it rejects oversized input for schemas that declare an explicit upper bound; per the maintainer, unbounded containers are unchanged. No released version remediates the unbounded (default) case described here, and an opt-in setting to cap total accumulated errors was proposed but not merged.
Zod schema-validation library through 4.6.5 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows attackers to exhaust memory by submitting a large array to an application using an array schema without a length constraint. Attackers can exploit the handleArrayResult parse logic in $ZodArray, which accumulates every validation issue for each failing element with no cap or early termination, causing the process to allocate excessive issue objects and crash due to out-of-memory conditions.
A vulnerability was determined in colinhacks Zod up to 4.3.6. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file packages/zod/src/v4/core/regexes.ts of the component CUID Data Type Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.