ntopng is a web-based network traffic monitoring application. Prior to 6.7.260718, scripts/lua/rest/v2/get/system/configurations/listavailablebackups.lua and scripts/lua/rest/v2/get/system/configurations/downloadbackup.lua allow any authenticated non-admin user to list and download system-configuration backups without an administrator check. The download path reaches backupconfig.exportbackup, and prefsdumputils.buildprefsdumptable includes the ntopng.user. Redis key space in the backup. A downloaded backup can therefore disclose password hashes for local users and, when configured, API tokens, TOTP secrets, and WebAuthn credential data, enabling account compromise through usable or recoverable credentials. This issue is fixed in version 6.7.260718.

An issue was discovered in ntopng 3.4 before 3.4.180617. The PRNG involved in the generation of session IDs is not seeded at program startup. This results in deterministic session IDs being allocated for active user sessions. An attacker with foreknowledge of the operating system and standard library in use by the host running the service and the username of the user whose session they're targeting can abuse the deterministic random number generation in order to hijack the user's session, thus escalating their access.

ntopng before 6.7.260717 fails to check user privileges in the pools bulk-delete endpoint, allowing authenticated non-administrators to delete all host pools and member bindings. Attackers can issue POST requests to the delete pools endpoint to irreversibly destroy every host pool, removing traffic policy bindings and visibility restrictions that may bypass security policies.

ntopng (aka ntop) before 2.2 allows remote authenticated users to change the login context and gain privileges via the user cookie and username parameter to admin/passwordreset.lua.