obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, tool dispatch does not compare the caller-controlled input.vault value with the vault bound to the caller, the JSON Web Token (JWT) has no vault claim, and the folder access-control list is shared globally. Any valid token can therefore select another configured vault and read, write, or delete its contents through affected tools. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by binding tokens and request context to a vault and rejecting mismatched input.vault values before scope checks.

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, undefined readPaths and writePaths settings allow all paths, strictReadDefault does not protect direct requests, and the .obsidian, .git, and .trash control directories are excluded only during enumeration. An authenticated caller can directly read sensitive files such as .obsidian/plugins//data.json, potentially exposing plugin API keys, Obsidian Sync passwords, and other in-vault data. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by denying the control directories by default and enforcing strictReadDefault on direct request paths.

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, the Streamable HTTP transport does not validate the Host or Origin header or enable DNS-rebinding protection. When the documented loopback configuration uses auth.mode set to none, a malicious web page can send requests to the local MCP endpoint and receive unrestricted vault access through the http-local caller. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by enabling host, origin, and DNS-rebinding validation.