A vulnerability was identified in OctoPrint 1.0.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function validate of the file src/octoprint/server/api/files.py of the component File Download API. Such manipulation of the argument filename leads to path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in OctoPrint 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function executeSystemCommand of the file src/octoprint/server/api/system.py of the component Command API. Performing a manipulation of the argument command results in os command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.9.3 contain a vulnerability that allows malicious admins to change the password of other admin accounts, including their own, without having to repeat their password.

An attacker who managed to hijack an admin account might use this to lock out actual admins from their OctoPrint instance.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.10.0.

Workarounds

OctoPrint administrators are strongly advised to thoroughly vet who has admin access to their installation.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Timothy "TK" Ruppert.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.5 are affected by a (theoretical) timing attack vulnerability that allows API key extraction over the network.

Due to using character based comparison that short-circuits on the first mismatched character during API key validation, rather than a cryptographical method with static runtime regardless of the point of mismatch, an attacker with network based access to an affected OctoPrint could extract API keys valid on the instance by measuring the response times of the denied access responses and guess an API key character by character.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.11.6.

Workaround

The likelihood of this attack actually working is highly dependent on the network's latency, noise and similar parameters. An actual proof of concept was not achieved so far. Still, as always administrators are advised to not expose their OctoPrint instance on hostile networks, especially not on the public Internet!

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Knox Liu.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.2 contain a vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker to upload a file under a specially crafted filename that will allow arbitrary command execution if said filename becomes included in a command defined in a system event handler and said event gets triggered.

If no event handlers executing system commands with uploaded filenames as parameters have been configured, this vulnerability does not have an impact.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.11.3.

Workaround

Until the patch has been applied, OctoPrint administrators who have event handlers configured that include any kind of filename based placeholders (i.e. {filename}, {filepath}, {filename}, {path}, etc -- refer to the events documentation for a full list) should disable those by setting their enabled property to False or unchecking the "Enabled" checkbox in the GUI based Event Manager.

Alternatively, OctoPrint administrators should set feature.enforceReallyUniversalFilenames to true in config.yaml and restart OctoPrint, then vet the existing uploads and make sure to delete any suspicious looking files (e.g. those that contain a ; in their name followed by a command).

As always, OctoPrint administrators are advised to not expose OctoPrint on hostile networks like the public internet, and to vet who has access to their instance.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by @prabhatverma47.