Summary
Focus command could miss controlScope enforcement. In affected versions, a caller able to trigger the focus command could run the command without enforcing the expected control scope.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could change focus state outside the intended caller authority. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.4.25.
Mitigations
restrict focus command access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Summary
Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs. In affected versions, a caller that can supply a group id to the affected policy resolver could resolve policy for an unvalidated group id.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could apply the wrong group-policy decision for a tool invocation. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.4.25.
Mitigations
avoid exposing group-policy controlled tools to untrusted senders until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Summary
Empty-scope device re-pairing could confuse caller scope containment. In affected versions, a device re-pairing request with an empty scope set could skip the intended containment guard during re-pairing.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could restore or retain scopes broader than the caller should grant. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.4.25.
Mitigations
revoke unexpected device sessions and require fresh pairing for suspicious devices until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.