Impact

Netty currently just skips control chars when these are present at the beginning / end of the header name. We should better fail fast as these are not allowed by the spec and could lead to HTTP request smuggling.

Failing to do the validation might cause netty to "sanitize" header names before it forward these to another remote system when used as proxy. This remote system can't see the invalid usage anymore and so not do the validation itself.

A flaw was found in curl. The flaw lies in how curl handles cached or pipelined responses that it receives from either a IMAP, POP3, SMTP or FTP server before the TLS upgrade using STARTTLS. In such a scenario curl even after upgrading to TLS would trust these cached responses treating them as valid and authenticated and use them. An attacker could potentially use this flaw to carry out a Man-In-The-Middle attack. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.

Apache Ant is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by an out-of-memory error when large amounts of memory are allocated. By persuading a victim to open a specially-crafted ZIP archive, a remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the application to crash.

Apache Ant is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by an out-of-memory error when large amounts of memory are allocated. By persuading a victim to open a specially-crafted TAR archive, a remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the application to crash.

curl 7.61.0 through 7.76.1 suffers from exposure of data element to wrong session due to a mistake in the code for CURLOPTSSLCIPHERLIST when libcurl is built to use the Schannel TLS library. The selected cipher set was stored in a single "static" variable in the library, which has the surprising side-effect that if an application sets up multiple concurrent transfers, the last one that sets the ciphers will accidentally control the set used by all transfers. In a worst-case scenario, this weakens transport security significantly.