Where
AND
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
5.9
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Impact The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only use a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1

This is a followup of https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj which did miss to fix this one case.

Patches This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final

Workarounds Validation can be done by the user before proxy the request by validating the header.

1 / 5
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Impact

Netty currently just skips control chars when these are present at the beginning / end of the header name. We should better fail fast as these are not allowed by the spec and could lead to HTTP request smuggling.

Failing to do the validation might cause netty to "sanitize" header names before it forward these to another remote system when used as proxy. This remote system can't see the invalid usage anymore and so not do the validation itself.

1 / 5
First published (updated )

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