Impact The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only use a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1

This is a followup of https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj which did miss to fix this one case.

Patches This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final

Workarounds Validation can be done by the user before proxy the request by validating the header.

Impact

Netty currently just skips control chars when these are present at the beginning / end of the header name. We should better fail fast as these are not allowed by the spec and could lead to HTTP request smuggling.

Failing to do the validation might cause netty to "sanitize" header names before it forward these to another remote system when used as proxy. This remote system can't see the invalid usage anymore and so not do the validation itself.

Impact The Bzip2 decompression decoder function doesn't allow setting size restrictions on the decompressed output data (which affects the allocation size used during decompression).

All users of Bzip2Decoder are affected. The malicious input can trigger an OOME and so a DoS attack

Workarounds No workarounds other than not using the Bzip2Decoder

References

Relevant code areas:

https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/netty-4.1.67.Final/codec/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/compression/Bzip2Decoder.java#L80 https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/netty-4.1.67.Final/codec/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/compression/Bzip2Decoder.java#L294 https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/netty-4.1.67.Final/codec/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/compression/Bzip2Decoder.java#L305