Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
XEE
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in FasterXML Jackson Databind which did not have entity expansion secured properly making it vulnerable to XML external entity (XXE). This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2019-10172. The primary threat from this flaw is data integrity.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

A flaw was found in the Apache Xerces Java (XercesJ) XML parser when handling specially crafted XML document payloads. This issue causes the XercesJ XML parser to wait in an infinite loop, which may consume system resources for a prolonged duration, leading to a denial of service condition.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Impact Accepting the value of various Text options of the Datepicker widget from untrusted sources may execute untrusted code. For example, initializing the datepicker in the following way: js $( "#datepicker" ).datepicker( { showButtonPanel: true, showOn: "both", closeText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'closeText XSS' )</script>", currentText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'currentText XSS' )</script>", prevText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'prevText XSS' )</script>", nextText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'nextText XSS' )</script>", buttonText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'buttonText XSS' )</script>", appendText: "<script>doEvilThing( 'appendText XSS' )</script>", } ); will call doEvilThing with 6 different parameters coming from all Text options.

Patches The issue is fixed in jQuery UI 1.13.0. The values passed to various Text options are now always treated as pure text, not HTML.

Workarounds A workaround is to not accept the value of the Text options from untrusted sources.

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery UI repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

1 / 5
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 prior to 2.9.10.1, 2.8.11.5, and 2.6.7.3. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the apache-log4j-extra (version 1.2.x) jar in the classpath, and an attacker can provide a JNDI service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.9.10, 2.8.11.5, and 2.6.7.3. It is related to com.zaxxer.hikari.HikariDataSource. This is a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-14540.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.9.2, 2.8.11.4, 2.7.9.6, and 2.6.7.3. This occurs when Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the logback jar in the classpath.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 prior to 2.9.10.1, 2.8.11.5, and 2.6.7.3. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the p6spy (3.8.6) jar in the classpath, and an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of com.p6spy.engine.spy.P6DataSource mishandling.

1 / 3

Remedy

The following conditions are needed for an exploit, we recommend avoiding all if possible * Deserialization from sources you do not control * `enableDefaultTyping()` * `@JsonTypeInfo using `id.CLASS` or `id.MINIMAL_CLASS`
First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203