Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.8
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 prior to 2.9.10.1, 2.8.11.5, and 2.6.7.3. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the apache-log4j-extra (version 1.2.x) jar in the classpath, and an attacker can provide a JNDI service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.6.7.4, 2.7.x before 2.7.9.7, 2.8.x before 2.8.11.5, and 2.9.x before 2.9.10.2 lacks certain net.sf.ehcache blocking.

1 / 3
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 prior to 2.9.10.1, 2.8.11.5, and 2.6.7.3. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the p6spy (3.8.6) jar in the classpath, and an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of com.p6spy.engine.spy.P6DataSource mishandling.

1 / 3

Remedy

The following conditions are needed for an exploit, we recommend avoiding all if possible * Deserialization from sources you do not control * `enableDefaultTyping()` * `@JsonTypeInfo using `id.CLASS` or `id.MINIMAL_CLASS`
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.10. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the commons-dbcp (1.4) jar in the classpath, and an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource and org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource mishandling.

1 / 2

Remedy

The following conditions are needed for an exploit, we recommend avoiding all if possible * Deserialization from sources you do not control * `enableDefaultTyping()` * `@JsonTypeInfo using `id.CLASS` or `id.MINIMAL_CLASS`
First published (updated )

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