Summary An incomplete SQL injection patch in the Admin Search Find API allows an authenticated attacker to perform blind SQL injection. Although CVE-2023-30848 attempted to mitigate SQL injection by removing SQL comments (--) and catching syntax errors, the fix is insufficient. Attackers can still inject SQL payloads that do not rely on comments and infer database information via blind techniques. This vulnerability affects the admin interface and can lead to database information disclosure.

Details The vulnerability exists in the Admin Search Find API endpoint: /admin/search/search/find In CVE-2023-30848, the following patch was applied:

- SQL comments are removed by replacing -- - SQL syntax errors are caught and replaced with a generic exception

Relevant commit: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/25ad8674886f2b938243cbe13e33e204a2e35cc3

Key changes include: // remove sql comments $fields = strreplace('--', '', $fields);

try { $hits = $searcherList->load(); } catch (SyntaxErrorException $syntaxErrorException) { throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Check your arguments.'); } However, this mitigation is incomplete for the following reasons:

1. Only -- is filtered

SQL injection does not require SQL comments. Payloads using boolean conditions, SQL functions, or time-based expressions remain effective.

2. Exception handling only suppresses error output

While syntax errors no longer produce detailed error messages, the underlying SQL query is still executed. This allows attackers to perform blind SQL injection.

3. User-controlled input is still used in SQL query construction The fields[] parameter is attacker-controlled and can be abused to inject SQL expressions into the generated query.

As a result, attackers can craft payloads that do not trigger syntax errors and still influence SQL execution. PoC The following request demonstrates a blind SQL injection via the fields[] parameter.

Boolean-based Blind Injection GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2& fields[]=field1 AND (SELECT CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END)=1~field2& filter=[{"property":"value"}]& class=classname Time-based Blind Injection GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2& fields[]=field1 AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)~field2& filter=[{"property":"value"}]& class=classname Observed behavior:

- When the condition is true, the response is delayed (e.g., ~5 seconds)

- When the condition is false, the response is returned immediately

This confirms that injected SQL expressions are executed successfully. Impact This is a Blind SQL Injection vulnerability.

- Affected users: Systems exposing the Admin Search Find API to authenticated users

- Attack requirements: Authenticated access to the admin interface

- Potential impact:

- Database schema enumeration - Extraction of sensitive data via blind SQL injection - Potential full database compromise depending on database privileges

This issue demonstrates that the fix for CVE-2023-30848 is incomplete.

Summary The httperrorlog file stores the $COOKIE and $SERVER variables, which means sensitive information such as database passwords, cookie session data, and other details can be accessed or recovered through the Pimcore backend.

Details It’s better to remove both lines, as this information makes little sense in this context anyway.

https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/blob/12.x/bundles/SeoBundle/src/EventListener/ResponseExceptionListener.php#L92 https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/blob/12.x/bundles/SeoBundle/src/EventListener/ResponseExceptionListener.php#L93

PoC In the Pimcore backend, navigate to "Search Engine Optimization" and click on "HTTP Errors." Double-click on an entry to view its details. Here, you may find sensitive data exposed.

Impact Pimcore backend users can access sensitive environment variables, potentially exposing critical information.

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. In versions up to and including 11.5.14.1 and 12.3.2, the filter query parameter in the dependency listing endpoints is JSON-decoded and the value field is concatenated directly into RLIKE clauses without sanitization or parameterized queries. Exploiting this issue requires admin authentication. An attacker with admin panel access can extract the full database including password hashes of other admin users. Version 12.3.3 contains a patch.

Summary The application fails to enforce proper server-side authorization checks on the API endpoint responsible for reading or listing static routes. In Pimcore, static routes are custom URL patterns defined via the backend interface or the var/config/staticroutes.php file, including details like regex-based patterns, controllers, variables, and priorities. These routes are registered automatically through the PimcoreStaticRoutesBundle and integrated into the MVC routing system. Testing revealed that an authenticated backend user lacking explicit permissions was able to invoke the endpoint (e.g., GET /api/static-routes) and retrieve sensitive route configurations. This violates OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control, as function-level authorization is absent, allowing unauthorized access to internal routing metadata. Without validation, the endpoint exposes route structures, potentially revealing application architecture, endpoints, or custom logic intended for administrative roles only.

Details The backend user without permission was still able to list "Static Routes" item

Step to Reproduce the issue login as Admin (full permission) and clicked "Static Routes" <img width="945" height="858" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-10 at 9 36 04 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3d4ce400-9bc2-493e-a899-60d5f42ad307" /> Then, captured and saved the request: -List API <img width="1122" height="570" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-10 at 9 44 17 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/81dfb589-fe5d-46ed-b5ee-869a49c08557" />

Next, login a backend user with no permission <img width="1219" height="744" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-10 at 9 06 12 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1dada4c4-d907-4477-9773-70dea3ef5816" />

The copy the "Cookie" and "X-Pimcore-Csrf-Token" <img width="1902" height="971" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-10 at 9 10 47 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63221682-fa14-429b-8665-fc9dd8bed890" />

After that, pasted the copied "Cookie" and "X-Pimcore-Csrf-Token" to captured request

-List API <img width="1132" height="829" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-10 at 9 47 27 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4edea3d1-f5d9-4758-9a07-e9d484c92864" />

Impact Exploitation enables low-privileged users to enumerate static routes, gaining reconnaissance into URL patterns, associated controllers, and parameter handling, which could facilitate targeted attacks like path traversal, injection via exposed variables, or discovery of hidden administrative paths. In a Pimcore environment, this might expose site-specific routing for multi-tenant setups, leading to unauthorized data access, workflow manipulation, or escalation to broader system compromise. Business impacts include intellectual property leakage of custom routing logic, regulatory non-compliance (e.g., GDPR for exposed configs), and increased attack surface for chaining with other vulnerabilities.