A potential denial-of-service issue in the Proxygen handling of invalid HTTP2 priority settings (specifically a circular dependency). This affects Proxygen prior to v2018.12.31.00.
Proxygen fails to validate that a secondary auth manager is set before dereferencing it. That can cause a denial of service issue when parsing a Certificate/CertificateRequest HTTP2 Frame over a fizz (TLS 1.3) transport. This issue affects Proxygen releases starting from v2018.10.29.00 until the fix in v2018.11.19.00.
An issue in the Proxygen handling of HTTP2 parsing of headers/trailers can lead to a denial-of-service attack. This affects Proxygen prior to v2018.12.31.00.
The SPDY/2 codec in Facebook Proxygen before 2015-11-09 truncates a certain field to two bytes, which allows hijacking and injection attacks.
The SPDY/2 codec in Facebook Proxygen before 2015-11-09 allows remote attackers to conduct hijacking attacks and bypass ACL checks via a crafted host value.
Facebook Proxygen before 2015-11-09 mismanages HTTPMessage.request state, which allows remote attackers to conduct hijacking attacks and bypass ACL checks.
In the course of decompressing HPACK inside the HTTP2 protocol, an unexpected sequence of header table resize operations can place the header table into a corrupted state, leading to a use-after-free condition and undefined behavior. This issue affects Proxygen from v0.29.0 until v2017.04.03.00.
An out of bounds write is possible via a specially crafted packet in certain configurations of Proxygen due to improper handling of Base64 when parsing malformed binary content in Structured HTTP Headers. This issue affects versions of proxygen prior to v2019.07.22.00.
A use-after-free is possible due to an error in lifetime management in the request adaptor when a malicious client invokes request error handling in a specific sequence. This issue affects versions of proxygen prior to v2020.05.18.00.
[I've seen multiple news articles & blogs in the wake of the coordinated disclosure today, but no postings here yet, so lets start fixing that.]
Google, Cloudflare, AWS, and others released details today of a protocol-level issue in HTTP/2 being exploited in recent months for denial-of-service attacks:
https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-it-works-the-novel-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack https://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-breakdown-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack/ https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-aws-protects-customers-from-ddos-events/
This attack works via the multiplexed streams feature of HTTP/2, in which the client repeatedly makes a request for a new stream, and then immediately sends a RSTSTREAM frame to cancel them, resulting in the server doing lots of extra work to set up and tear down the streams, while not hitting any server-side limit on a maximum number of active streams per connection.
CVE-2023-44487 was issued to track this issue across implementations: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-44487
A script to check for affected implemenations has been posted at: https://github.com/bcdannyboy/CVE-2023-44487
Information I've found so far on open source implementations (most via the current listings in the CVE) include:
- Apache httpd: https://chaos.social/@icing/111210915918780532
- caddy: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/5877
- envoy: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/pull/30055
- golang: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/63417 https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iNNxDTCjZvo
- h2o: https://github.com/h2o/h2o/security/advisories/GHSA-2m7v-gc89-fjqf https://github.com/h2o/h2o/pull/3291
- haproxy: https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy/issues/2312
- hyper: https://seanmonstar.com/post/730794151136935936/hyper-http2-rapid-reset-unaffected
- jetty: https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/issues/10679 https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.0.2 https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-11.0.17 https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-10.0.17 https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-9.4.53.v20231009
- netty: https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/58f75f665aa81a8cbcf6ffa74820042a285c5e61
- nghttp2: https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/pull/1961 https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/releases/tag/v1.57.0
- nginx: https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-2-rapid-reset-attack-impacting-f5-nginx-products/ https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2023-October/S36Q5HBXR7CAIMPLLPRSSSYR4PCMWILK.html
- nodejs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/50121
- proxygen: https://github.com/facebook/proxygen/pull/466
- swift-nio-http2: https://forums.swift.org/t/swift-nio-http2-security-update-cve-2023-44487-http-2-dos/67764
- tomcat: https://tomcat.apache.org/security-11.html#FixedinApacheTomcat11.0.0-M12 https://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html#FixedinApacheTomcat10.1.14 https://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html#FixedinApacheTomcat9.0.81 https://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html#FixedinApacheTomcat8.5.94
-- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris