Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.1
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A path traversal vulnerability was found in pulpcore. The content upload API accepts a 'fileurl' parameter that allows users with file repository privileges to specify a local file URL for Pulp to download and store. A URL scheme validation check uses a string prefix comparison that only rejects URLs beginning with 'file://', but Python's URL parser recognizes the 'file:' scheme without double slashes, creating a mismatch between what is validated and what is dispatched to the file downloader. An authenticated user with low-privilege repository permissions can supply a specially crafted URL using relative path traversal sequences to read any file accessible to the Pulp server process. In deployments that include Pulp Container, successful exploitation allows an attacker to read the container registry token signing private key and forge bearer tokens, granting unauthorized access to all private container repositories in the affected registry.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
7
Path Traversal

A path traversal vulnerability was found in pulpcore's relativepathvalidator (pulpcore/app/serializers/fields.py). The validator only checks os.path.isabs() to block paths starting with "/", but does not block "../" directory traversal sequences anywhere in the path.

When a user creates content via POST /api/v3/content/file/files/ with a crafted relativepath (e.g., "looking/normal/../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"), the value passes validation and is stored in ContentArtifact.relativepath. During FilesystemExport (pulpcore/app/tasks/export.py), os.path.join(path, relativepath) resolves outside the export directory, and the raw artifact content (fully attacker-controlled) is written to the escaped path.

The process runs as the "pulp" system user. File permission bits cannot be set by the attacker. FilesystemExport is only accessible to admin-level users (SSL cert auth in Satellite, admin role in RBAC deployments).

Affected: pulpcore (all versions through current HEAD 3.110.0.dev) Fix: Not yet available (coordinating with upstream) Reporter: Martin Brodeur (independent security researcher) PSIRT Ticket: PSIRTSUPT-7617

First published (updated )

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