Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.4
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Deserialization of untrusted data in the report-processing code of Puppet, as used by Puppet Server, in the affected releases, allows a client that holds any CA-signed agent certificate to execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as its service user by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type via PUT request. Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain such a certificate.

1 / 2
Source: OSV
First published (updated )

Hello from the OpenVox project.

We released updates to mitigate two 9+ CVE vulnerabilities that affect all known OpenVox and Puppet versions and implementations. Please update any usage of OpenVox to the versions listed below or greater. This includes your own infrastructures or in any repackaged or bundled usage. - openvox-agent versions 9.3.0 and 8.32.0 - openvox-server versions 9.2.0 and 8.18.0 - openvoxdb versions 9.2.0 and 8.18.0

We would also recommend that any usage of OSS Puppet should be migrated to OpenVox as soon as possible, as Puppet will not be receiving security updates.

Remote Code Execution on the OpenVox Server

The Puppet/OpenVox report is a JSON document the agent sends to the server after each enforcement run. It details what changes were made, any warnings or error messages, and any resources that failed to apply correctly. It also contains a full list of all events that happened, where an event might be "content \<foo\> changed to \<bar\>" or the like. In some circumstances involving custom resource types, an event might include a serialized Ruby object (programming code turned into text) instead of just plain JSON. When the report is processed, these objects are deserialized back into something the compiler can use. Unfortunately a malicious event object can be constructed in such a way that code executes on the server when this happens. Read more at https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/security/advisories/GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq

Client Impersonation in Trapperkeeper apps

Trapperkeeper is the framework we use for running our Clojure based applications and trapperkeeper-authorization is the shared authentication library that parses OpenVox's auth.conf file and such. This file allows authentication rules to be specified in multiple ways, including plain strings (foo.example.com), wildcards (.example.com), or regular expressions (/lab-\d{3}.example.com/). Plain strings and wildcard matches were handled by the same logic and this resulted in wildcard behavior incorrectly showing up in all non-regex rules. The end result of this meant that a certificate name of evil.target.example.com would be allowed to impersonate target.example.com and access information or perform actions as the target certname. In some non-default configurations, this could even inject exported resources into arbitrary agent catalogs across the infrastructure. Read more at https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization/security/advisories/GHSA-q4hm-33rc-572g

More info

CVE numbers are pending GitHub review. The advisories will be updated and the numbers forwarded here when issued.

The blog post has more information, including migration instructions and mitigation advice. https://voxpupuli.org/blog/2026/11/03/critical-cve-updates/

Thanks to Alain from Neodyme for reporting the server issues and working with us to coordinate.

--- Ben Ford Open Source infrastructure management with ethics binford2k () overlookinfratech com https://overlookinfratech.com Book time with me <https://calendar.app.google/qhH96i65htaRaYQt7>

Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in Puppet, where changes in the application lead to node declarations having increased access. An attacker can use this flaw to modify run facts and to retrieve different nodes of information when the stricthostnamechecking is false, and the node's catalog falls back to the default node.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
Input Validation
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Puppet Agent 1.10.x prior to 1.10.13, Puppet Agent 5.3.x prior to 5.3.7, and Puppet Agent 5.5.x prior to 5.5.2 on Windows only, with a specially crafted configuration file an attacker could get pxp-agent to load arbitrary code with privilege escalation.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In Puppet Agent 1.10.x prior to 1.10.13, Puppet Agent 5.3.x prior to 5.3.7, Puppet Agent 5.5.x prior to 5.5.2, Facter on Windows is vulnerable to a DLL preloading attack, which could lead to a privilege escalation.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Puppet Enterprise 2016.4.x prior to 2016.4.12, Puppet Enterprise 2017.3.x prior to 2017.3.7, Puppet Enterprise 2018.1.x prior to 2018.1.1, Puppet Agent 1.10.x prior to 1.10.13, Puppet Agent 5.3.x prior to 5.3.7, and Puppet Agent 5.5.x prior to 5.5.2, were vulnerable to an attack where an unprivileged user on Windows agents could write custom facts that can escalate privileges on the next puppet run. This was possible through the loading of shared libraries from untrusted paths.

First published (updated )
Severity
3.3
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P

Description of problem: I noticed that puppet may create several predictable files in /tmp, e.g.

/tmp/daemonout /tmp/puppetdoc.txt /tmp/puppetdoc.tex

There are also a lot more in the tests, but they may not be run in Fedora's F10 spec, and even more in the puppet source, e.g. for the dmg installation provider.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): puppet-0.24.8-1.fc10

How reproducible: always

Steps to Reproduce: 1. grep -nR /tmp/ /usr/lib/ruby/siteruby/1.8/puppet

Actual results: Contains ruby code like: /usr/lib/ruby/siteruby/1.8/puppet/daemon.rb:33: File.open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|

Expected results: Should only report findings that are not executed, e.g. in comments or help information

Additional info: Current git seems to contain even more issues, e.g. lib/puppet/network/server.rb:25: File.open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

In previous versions of Puppet Agent it was possible to install a module with world writable permissions. Puppet Agent 5.3.4 and 1.10.10 included a fix to this vulnerability.

1 / 3
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )

Latest version: 8.18.0

First published (updated )

Latest version: 8.18.0

First published (updated )
Severity
8.2
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

It was found that Puppet will deserialize data off the wire (from the agent to the server, in this case) with a attacker-specified format. This could be used to force YAML deserialization in an unsafe manner, which would lead to remote code execution. This change constrains the format of data on the wire to PSON or safely decoded YAML.

External References:

https://puppet.com/security/cve/cve-2017-2295

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

In previous versions of Puppet Agent it was possible for the agent to retrieve facts from an environment that it was not classified to retrieve from. This was resolved in Puppet Agent 5.3.4, included in Puppet Enterprise 2017.3.4

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
2.6
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N

Puppet 2.6.x before 2.6.12 and 2.7.x before 2.7.6, and Puppet Enterprise (PE) Users 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 before 1.2.4, when signing an agent certificate, adds the Puppet master's certdnsnames values to the X.509 Subject Alternative Name field of the certificate, which allows remote attackers to spoof a Puppet master via a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against an agent that uses an alternate DNS name for the master, aka "AltNames Vulnerability."

First published (updated )
Severity
4.4
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Puppet 2.6.x before 2.6.14 and 2.7.x before 2.7.11, and Puppet Enterprise (PE) Users 1.0, 1.1, 1.2.x, 2.0.x before 2.0.3, when managing a user login file with the k5login resource type, allows local users to gain privileges via a symlink attack on .k5login.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.9
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

The changeuser method in the SUIDManager (lib/puppet/util/suidmanager.rb) in Puppet 2.6.x before 2.6.14 and 2.7.x before 2.7.11, and Puppet Enterprise (PE) Users 1.0, 1.1, 1.2.x, 2.0.x before 2.0.3 does not properly manage group privileges, which allows local users to gain privileges via vectors related to (1) the changeuser not dropping supplementary groups in certain conditions, (2) changes to the eguid without associated changes to the egid, or (3) the addition of the real gid to supplementary groups.

First published (updated )
Severity
1

From puppet labs: Puppet agents with certnames of IP addresses can be impersonated

This affects Puppet 2.6.16 and 2.7.17

If an authenticated host with a certname of an IP address changes IP addresses, and a second host assumes the first host's former IP address, the second host will be treated by the puppet master as the first one, giving the second host access to the first host's catalog. Note: This will not be fixed in Puppet versions prior to the forthcoming 3.x. Instead, with this announcement IP-based authentication in Puppet < 3.x is deprecated.

Resolved in Puppet 2.6.17, 2.7.18

First published (updated )
EOL
Apr 30, 2025

End of life: 4/30/2025, Latest version: 7.35.0

First published (updated )
EOL
Apr 30, 2025

End of life: 4/30/2025, Latest version: 7.35.0

First published (updated )

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