Apache Airflow Amazon provider: the AWS auth manager's SAML login flow does not bind the authentication response to the browser that began it. The login handler discards the AuthnRequest ID and the callback validates the assertion without requiring a matching InResponseTo, so an unauthenticated attacker who can cause a victim to load a page can complete a SAML login in the victim's browser using the attacker's own assertion, silently logging the victim into the attacker's Airflow account. Subsequent work the victim performs lands in a session the attacker controls.
Affects deployments using the AWS auth manager with SAML authentication. The victim needs only to visit an attacker-controlled page; no Airflow account or credential is required of the attacker. This is the same login-CSRF class fixed in the Keycloak auth manager as CVE-2026-40948.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-amazon are recommended to upgrade to version 9.38.0, which fixes the issue.
In the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends of apache-airflow-providers-amazon prior to 9.28.0, the team-scoping logic could resolve a connid containing a / (e.g. "myteam/conn") to the same path as another team's team-scoped secret when the caller had no team context. A privileged caller without team context could therefore retrieve another team's secret by crafting a colliding connid. Fixed in 9.28.0 by switching the team-scope separator to -- and rejecting team-shaped connids when team context is absent. Affects the experimental multi-tenant teams feature only. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.28.0, which fixes the issue.
Severity: low
Affected versions:
- Apache Airflow Amazon provider (apache-airflow-providers-amazon) before 9.28.0
Description:
In the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends of apache-airflow-providers-amazon prior to 9.28.0, the team-scoping logic could resolve a connid containing a / (e.g. "myteam/conn") to the same path as another team's team-scoped secret when the caller had no team context. A privileged caller without team context could therefore retrieve another team's secret by crafting a colliding connid. Fixed in 9.28.0 by switching the team-scope separator to -- and rejecting team-shaped connids when team context is absent. Affects the experimental multi-tenant teams feature only. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.28.0, which fixes the issue.
Credit:
Justin Pakzad (remediation developer)
References:
https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/65703 https://airflow.apache.org/ https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42526
In AWS Auth manager, the origin of the SAML authentication has been used as provided by the client and not verified against the actual instance URL. This allowed to gain access to different instances with potentially different access controls by reusing SAML response from other instances.
You should upgrade to 9.22.0 version of provider if you use AWS Auth Manager.