Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 3.5.0 until 3.13.0, built-in penetration-detection patterns in guardcore/handlers/suspatternshandler.py execute through a direct pattern.search(content) call instead of the timeout-protected createsafematcher() path used for custom patterns. The built-in template-injection detector contains an unbounded expression with quadratic behavior when scanning repeated opening braces. Because penetration detection and enhanced mode are enabled by a stock SecurityConfig, an unauthenticated request can block the shared asyncio event loop, affecting all application endpoints. The triggering input does not produce a detection match, so the request can complete without incrementing ban counters or being recorded as suspicious. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

First published (updated )
Severity
3.7
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, ContentPreprocessor.preprocess() in guardcore/detectionengine/preprocessor.py collapses all whitespace before built-in pattern matching in the default enhanced mode. This removes carriage returns and newlines required by the httpsplit and newline-anchored cmdinjection detectors in guardcore/handlers/suspatternshandler.py, making those detectors unable to match. Framework-decoded CRLF can therefore pass through Guard Core unflagged while the downstream application still receives the raw newline-bearing value. Direct security impact requires a downstream stack or application that persists or re-emits the value into a CRLF-tolerant response or command context. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.4
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L

Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, extractfromforwardedheader() in guardcore/utils.py returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without validating that it is an IP address. In deployments configured with trustedproxies where the selected entry is attacker-controlled, the arbitrary clientip string reaches BehaviorTracker in guardcore/handlers/behaviorhandler.py and is interpolated into Redis key names and blocking KEYS glob patterns. Glob metacharacters can cause one request to count other clients' behavior events, embedded separators can disturb key parsing, and rotating identities can create unbounded keys while repeatedly scanning the shared Redis keyspace. A non-IP identity can also reach a ban action and cause an uncaught validation error. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

First published (updated )

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