LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.3.9, several LangChain components that resolve filesystem paths or expand search patterns do not consistently confine the resolved path to the intended root directory. Affected behaviors include: a file-search agent middleware that validates a starting directory but not the search pattern or the resolved target of matched files, so glob patterns and symlinks can reach files outside the configured root; prompt- and chain/agent-configuration loaders that accept path fields and resolve them without confining the result to a trusted base or rejecting symlink targets; and path-prefix authorization checks that compare by string prefix without a path-segment boundary, so a sibling path sharing the prefix is accepted. When these components receive path values, search patterns, or workspace contents influenced by an untrusted source — including an LLM acting on untrusted input — the result can be disclosure of files outside the intended boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.9.
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting
Summary The ChatOpenAI.getnumtokensfrommessages() method fetches arbitrary imageurl values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input.
Severity Low - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to: - Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF) - Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion - Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing
Impact An attacker who can control image URLs passed to getnumtokensfrommessages() can: - Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs - Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints) - Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout)
Note: This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows).
Details The vulnerable code path: 1. getnumtokensfrommessages() processes messages containing imageurl content blocks 2. For images without detail: "low", it calls urltosize() to fetch the image and compute token counts 3. urltosize() performs httpx.get(imagesource) on any URL without validation 4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout
File: libs/partners/openai/langchainopenai/chatmodels/base.py
Patches The vulnerability has been patched in langchain-openai==1.1.9 (requires langchain-core==1.2.11).
The patch adds: 1. SSRF validation using langchaincore.security.ssrfprotection.validatesafeurl() to block: - Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local) - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.) - Invalid URL schemes 2. Explicit size limits (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI's payload limit) 3. Explicit timeout (5 seconds, same as httpx.get default) 4. Allow disabling image fetching via allowfetchingimages=False parameter
Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Sanitize input: Validate and filter imageurl values before passing messages to token counting or model invocation 2. Use network controls: Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs
LangChain versions up to and including 0.3.1 contain a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the MRKLOutputParser.parse() method (libs/langchain/langchain/agents/mrkl/outputparser.py). The parser applies a backtracking-prone regular expression when extracting tool actions from model output. An attacker who can supply or influence the parsed text (for example via prompt injection in downstream applications that pass LLM output directly into MRKLOutputParser.parse()) can trigger excessive CPU consumption by providing a crafted payload, causing significant parsing delays and a denial-of-service condition.