opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) before 1.4.9 contains two weaknesses in the portable USB drive feature, whose threat model treats the removable drive as untrusted (attacker with physical write access). USBDriveCreator.verifyintegrityfile only validates files listed in the manifest, so files added to the drive — including a root-level autorun payload — are not detected and integrity verification still passes. Additionally, a globally constant, source-embedded KDF salt (LEGACYFIXEDSALT) is used to derive the drive encryption key for any drive lacking a per-drive salt file, defeating precomputation resistance and enabling an offline rainbow-table attack.

opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8 do not redact the keyserver bearer token passed as the positional argument to 'keyserver set-token' in the --debug argv dump, because sanitizeargvfordebug fails to sanitize it. As a result the token is printed in cleartext to stderr under --debug (even without --unsafe-show-secrets), persisting the credential in logs and terminal history. Fixed in 1.4.9.

opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8 contain a CWD-relative configuration file resolution flaw in cryptsettings.py, where CONFIGFILE (originally the absolute per-user path ~/.cryptsettings.json) is reassigned at line 84 to the bare relative name 'cryptsettings.json'. As a result, the legacy Tk GUI's SettingsTab reads and writes KDF settings from cryptsettings.json in the process launch (current working) directory instead of the user's home directory. An attacker who plants a malicious cryptsettings.json (e.g. sha256:1 with all memory-hard KDFs disabled) can silently downgrade encryption performed in that GUI session to roughly one hash round, bypassing the weak-KDF preflight and enabling offline brute-force attacks against the resulting ciphertext. Fixed in 1.4.9.

openssl-encrypt (pip package, versions <= 1.4.8) fails to sanitize filenames read from untrusted drive data (outside the AES-GCM authenticated manifest) before printing them in the verify-usb command's output. An attacker can plant filenames containing terminal cursor-movement and erase-line control bytes that repaint a forged PASSED verdict on screen, masking actual tamper detection. Fixed in 1.4.9 by routing drive-derived names through sanitizefordisplay().

openssl-encrypt (pip package) before 1.4.9 contains a symlink-following flaw in its verify-usb v2 added-file allowlist scan. The scan enumerated the drive with rglob(), which in CPython does not descend into symlinked directories and treats the symlink as an ordinary directory, while ONOFOLLOW on the hash side binds only the final path component. An evil-maid attacker with physical access to the removable drive could replace a tool-tree directory with a symlink to a copy containing byte-identical files plus a planted pycache/.pyc file (which CPython loads in preference to recompiling the clean .py). The planted file is never enumerated, addedfiles stays 0, and verify-usb reports PASSED, resulting in code execution when the victim runs the portable install. Fixed in 1.4.9 (affects both 1.4.x and 1.5.x lines).

In opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8, the desktop GUI passes the steganography password to the CLI child process on the command line via the --stego-password argument (on both encrypt and decrypt paths) instead of via an environment variable as done for the main password. Any local user can read the steganography password from /proc/<pid>/cmdline for the lifetime of the subprocess. Fixed in 1.4.9.

opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions 1.4.8 and earlier store an mTLS client private key in cleartext within a world-readable (0644) SharedPreferences file via the desktop GUI's Settings screen 'combined certificate and private key' PEM field. A local attacker with file system access can read the exposed private key. Version 1.4.9 writes the PEM to a dedicated 0600 file, keeps only its path in SharedPreferences, and migrates/scrubs existing cleartext values.

opensslencrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8 advertise a portable USB workspace as an 'Encrypted USB Workspace' with AES-256-GCM encryption and write a marker declaring the workspace encrypted, but the workspace directory is actually stored in cleartext and the derived encryption key is never applied to it. A user who trusts the branding and places files in the workspace leaves them unencrypted on the removable media, so an attacker with physical access to the media can read the sensitive files. Fixed in 1.4.9, which seals the workspace into an authenticated AES-256-GCM vault.