Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser can accumulate unbounded data when a multipart part’s header block never terminates with the required blank line (CRLFCRLF). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes to memory without a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service (DoS).

Details

While reading multipart headers, the parser waits for CRLFCRLF using:

ruby @sbuf.scanuntil(/(.?\r\n)\r\n/m)

If the terminator never appears, it continues appending data (@sbuf.concat(content)) indefinitely. There is no limit on accumulated header bytes, so a single malformed part can consume memory proportional to the request body size.

Impact

Attackers can send incomplete multipart headers to trigger high memory use, leading to process termination (OOM) or severe slowdown. The effect scales with request size limits and concurrency. All applications handling multipart uploads may be affected.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched Rack version that caps per-part header size (e.g., 64 KiB). Until then, restrict maximum request sizes at the proxy or web server layer (e.g., Nginx clientmaxbodysize).

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).

Details

During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:

ruby body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer @mimeparts[mimeindex].body << content

There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to params.

Impact

Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.

Mitigation

Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds: Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx clientmaxbodysize). Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser buffers the entire multipart preamble (bytes before the first boundary) in memory without any size limit. A client can send a large preamble followed by a valid boundary, causing significant memory use and potential process termination due to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions.

Details

While searching for the first boundary, the parser appends incoming data into a shared buffer (@sbuf.concat(content)) and scans for the boundary pattern:

ruby @sbuf.scanuntil(@bodyregex)

If the boundary is not yet found, the parser continues buffering data indefinitely. There is no trimming or size cap on the preamble, allowing attackers to send arbitrary amounts of data before the first boundary.

Impact

Remote attackers can trigger large transient memory spikes by including a long preamble in multipart/form-data requests. The impact scales with allowed request sizes and concurrency, potentially causing worker crashes or severe slowdown due to garbage collection.

Mitigation

Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a preamble size limit (e.g., 16 KiB) or discards preamble data entirely per RFC 2046 § 5.1.1. Workarounds: Limit total request body size at the proxy or web server level. Monitor memory and set per-process limits to prevent OOM conditions.

Summary

Rack::QueryParser parses query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies into Ruby data structures without imposing any limit on the number of parameters, allowing attackers to send requests with extremely large numbers of parameters.

Details

The vulnerability arises because Rack::QueryParser iterates over each &-separated key-value pair and adds it to a Hash without enforcing an upper bound on the total number of parameters. This allows an attacker to send a single request containing hundreds of thousands (or more) of parameters, which consumes excessive memory and CPU during parsing.

Impact

An attacker can trigger denial of service by sending specifically crafted HTTP requests, which can cause memory exhaustion or pin CPU resources, stalling or crashing the Rack server. This results in full service disruption until the affected worker is restarted.

Mitigation

- Update to a version of Rack that limits the number of parameters parsed, or - Use middleware to enforce a maximum query string size or parameter count, or - Employ a reverse proxy (such as Nginx) to limit request sizes and reject oversized query strings or bodies.

Limiting request body sizes and query string lengths at the web server or CDN level is an effective mitigation.

Summary

Rack::Static can serve files under the specified root: even if urls: are provided, which may expose other files under the specified root: unexpectedly.

Details

The vulnerability occurs because Rack::Static does not properly sanitize user-supplied paths before serving files. Specifically, encoded path traversal sequences are not correctly validated, allowing attackers to access files outside the designated static file directory.

Impact

By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can gain access to all files under the specified root: directory, provided they are able to determine then path of the file.

Mitigation

- Update to the latest version of Rack, or - Remove usage of Rack::Static, or - Ensure that root: points at a directory path which only contains files which should be accessed publicly.

It is likely that a CDN or similar static file server would also mitigate the issue.

Summary

Rack::Sendfile can be exploited by crafting input that includes newline characters to manipulate log entries.

Details

The Rack::Sendfile middleware logs unsanitized header values from the X-Sendfile-Type header. An attacker can exploit this by injecting escape sequences (such as newline characters) into the header, resulting in log injection.

Impact

This vulnerability can distort log files, obscure attack traces, and complicate security auditing.

Mitigation

- Update to the latest version of Rack, or - Remove usage of Rack::Sendfile.

Summary

Rack::CommonLogger can be exploited by crafting input that includes newline characters to manipulate log entries. The supplied proof-of-concept demonstrates injecting malicious content into logs.

Details

When a user provides the authorization credentials via Rack::Auth::Basic, if success, the username will be put in env['REMOTEUSER'] and later be used by Rack::CommonLogger for logging purposes.

The issue occurs when a server intentionally or unintentionally allows a user creation with the username contain CRLF and white space characters, or the server just want to log every login attempts. If an attacker enters a username with CRLF character, the logger will log the malicious username with CRLF characters into the logfile.

Impact

Attackers can break log formats or insert fraudulent entries, potentially obscuring real activity or injecting malicious data into log files.

Mitigation

- Update to the latest version of Rack.