Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
5
Infoleak
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in ldapattr and ldapentry community modules for Ansbile. This issue discloses the LDAP bind password to stdout or a log file if a playbook task is written using the bindpw in the parameters field since nothing in the params field is evaluated for sensitive data.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in Ansible Engine affecting Ansible Engine versions 2.7.x before 2.7.17 and 2.8.x before 2.8.11 and 2.9.x before 2.9.7 as well as Ansible Tower before and including versions 3.4.5 and 3.5.5 and 3.6.3 when using modules which decrypts vault files such as assemble, script, unarchive, wincopy, awss3 or copy modules. The temporary directory is created in /tmp leaves the s ts unencrypted. On Operating Systems which /tmp is not a tmpfs but part of the root partition, the directory is only cleared on boot and the decryp emains when the host is switched off. The system will be vulnerable when the system is not running. So decrypted data must be cleared as soon as possible and the data which normally is encrypted ble.

1 / 3

Remedy

Currently, there is no mitigation for this issue except by removing manually the temporary created file after every run.
First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in the Ansible Engine, in ansible-engine 2.8.x before 2.8.15 and ansible-engine 2.9.x before 2.9.13, when installing packages using the dnf module. GPG signatures are ignored during installation even when disablegpgcheck is set to False, which is the default behavior. This flaw leads to malicious packages being installed on the system and arbitrary code executed via package installation scripts. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to integrity and system availability.

1 / 3
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
7.9
Code Injection, Race Condition
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in Ansible Engine, all versions 2.7.x, 2.8.x and 2.9.x prior to 2.7.17, 2.8.11, and 2.9.7 respectively, when using ansiblefacts as a subkey of itself and promoting it to a variable when inject is enabled, overwriting the ansiblefacts after the clean. An attacker could take advantage of this by altering the ansiblefacts, such as ansiblehosts, users and any other key data which would lead into privilege escalation or code injection.

1 / 3
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in Ansible Tower, versions 3.6.x before 3.6.2 and 3.5.x before 3.5.4, when /websocket is requested and the password contains the '#' character. This request would cause a socket error in RabbitMQ when parsing the password and an HTTP error code 500 and partial password disclose will occur in plaintext. An attacker could easily guess some predictable passwords or brute force the password.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in Ansible Tower, versions 3.6.x before 3.6.2, where files in '/var/backup/tower' are left world-readable. These files include both the SECRETKEY and the database backup. Any user with access to the Tower server, and knowledge of when a backup is run, could retrieve every credential stored in Tower. Access to data is the highest threat with this vulnerability.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

A flaw was found in Ansible Tower, versions 3.6.x before 3.6.2 and 3.5.x before 3.5.3, where enabling RabbitMQ manager by setting it with '-e rabbitmqenablemanager=true' exposes the RabbitMQ management interface publicly, as expected. If the default admin user is still active, an attacker could guess the password and gain access to the system.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

A vulnerability was found in Ansible Tower before 3.6.1 where an attacker with low privilege could retrieve usernames and passwords credentials from the new RHSM saved in plain text into the database at '/api/v2/config' when applying the Ansible Tower license.

First published (updated )

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