A double-free was found in the way 389-ds-base handles virtual attributes context in persistent searches. An attacker could send a series of search requests, forcing the server to behave unexpectedly, and crash.

A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks used to break Wi-Fi handshakes that negotiate session keys was discovered. These attacks target the Wi-Fi/WPA2 standard. An adversary can trick a vulnerable Access Point (AP) into reinstalling the pairwise key by retransmitted or replayed FT Reassociation Request. While reinstalling the already in-use key, the associated packet number (sometimes also called nonce) and receive replay counter is reset. This causes nonce reuse, voiding any security the underlying encryption protocol is supposed to provide. For example, it allows decryption or injection of frames, and enables an attacker to replay frames.

A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks used to break Wi-Fi handshakes that negotiate session keys was discovered. These attacks target the Wi-Fi/WPA2 standard. An adversary can trick a client or Access Point (AP) into reinstalling an already-in use group key in 4-way handshake. While reinstalling the already in-use key, the associated packet number (sometimes also called nonce) and receive replay counter is reset. This causes nonce reuse, voiding any security the underlying encryption protocol is supposed to provide. For example, it allows decryption or injection of frames, and enables an attacker to replay frames.

A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks used to break Wi-Fi handshakes that negotiate session keys was discovered. These attacks target the Wi-Fi/WPA2 standard. An adversary can trick a client or Access Point (AP) into reinstalling an already-in use group key in the group key handshake. While reinstalling the already in-use key, the associated packet number (sometimes also called nonce) and receive replay counter is reset. This causes nonce reuse, voiding any security the underlying encryption protocol is supposed to provide. For example, it allows decryption or injection of frames, and enables an attacker to replay frames.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.