Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in libxml2 2.5.10, 2.6.16, 2.6.26, 2.6.27, and 2.6.32, and libxml 1.8.17, allow context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via crafted (1) Notation or (2) Enumeration attribute types in an XML file, as demonstrated by the Codenomicon XML fuzzing framework.

The NFS client implementation in the kernel in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 3, when a filesystem is mounted with the noacl option, checks permissions for the open system call via vfspermission (mode bits) data rather than an NFS ACCESS call to the server, which allows local client processes to obtain a false success status from open calls that the server would deny, and possibly obtain sensitive information about file permissions on the server, as demonstrated in a rootsquash environment. NOTE: it is uncertain whether any scenarios involving this issue cross privilege boundaries.

OpenOffice.org 1.1.x packages as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 and 4 shipped with certain libraries built with insecure RPATH set in the ELF header. RPATH was incorrectly set to '$ORIGIN' instead of $ORIGIN.

This issue can be exploited by a local user to run arbitrary code as some other user if victim can be convinced to run openoffice in the attacker controlled directory with specially crafted content.

Memory leak in a certain Red Hat deployment of vsftpd before 2.0.5 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 3 and 4, when PAM is used, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large number of invalid authentication attempts within the same session, a different vulnerability than CVE-2007-5962.

Buffer overflow in pattern.c in libxslt before 1.1.24 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via an XSL style sheet file with a long XSLT "transformation match" condition that triggers a large number of steps.

Description of problem:

The default IPSec ifup script (/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec) initializes the racoon configuration to use aggressive IKE mode, then fallback to main IKE mode if that fails:

... remote $DST { exchangemode aggressive, main; ...

Due to widely known attacks, the aggressive mode should be only used when public key authentication is in use. In practice, most administrators use IPSec with PSK authentication, which combined with aggressive mode leads to aforementioned vulnerability.

See this whitepaper for more information: http://www.netsc.ch/IMG/pdf/TargetingIKEen.pdf

The exchangemode should be changed to "main" only or, for a low-security fallback, to "main, aggressive" (in the opposite order than currently).

During some routine code review last week, Alasdair Kergon spotted a security flaw in the clustered LVM daemon, clvmd. The report from him is as follows:

Clvmd, a privileged process, accepts, acts upon and responds to communications from unprivileged processes.

Background information ======================

clvmd belongs to the lvm2-cluster package and as such is normally used in shared storage clusters, where several machines are using the same disks in parallel. It is run on every machine in such a cluster. The daemon has to be enabled explictly after installing the package: it does not run by default (since RHEL4.5). Systems not running the daemon i.e. most LVM systems, not subscribed to RHN clustering channels, are not vulnerable.

Clvmd has three roles that require root privilege:

(1) Communicate with clvmd processes on other machines;

(2) Hold locks to ensure conflicting commands are not run in parallel;

(3) Make Logical Volumes available for use on the local machine by issuing the appropriate device-mapper ioctls to the kernel.

When a LVM command is issued in a cluster, an instruction is sent to the local clvmd to obtain the necessary locks and to activate or deactivate logical volumes. Any changes to the on-disk LVM metadata are performed by the original LVM process - not by clvmd itself - and then the instance of clvmd on each machine reads the updated metadata independently from disk.

The flaw ========

The problem was caused by an upstream commit made in April 2004. Prior to that, the communication between lvm and clvmd was through a socket in the filesystem, so it was protected by standard file-system security mechanisms. The commit in question changed it to use an abstract socket starting with a NUL byte (see 'man 7 unix') but no attempt was made to secure it by exchanging credentials. Consequently an unprivileged process can instruct clvmd to perform operations that were supposed to be available only to root.

Operations available to an attacker:

(1) Instruct clvmd to suspend the use of any Logical Volume visible to any machine in the cluster with immediate effect.

(2) Instruct clvmd to activate, deactivate or reload any Logical Volume visible to any machine in the cluster. (Deactivation will fail if the Logical Volume is in use.)

(3) Instruct clvmd to die.

(4) Instruct clvmd to restart (versions 2.02.64 and later).

(5) Instruct clvmd to obtain, release or report the state of locks held by the daemon.

(6) Enable/disable clvmd's debugging mode which controls the amount of detail it logs.

(7) Instruct clvmd to create a backup of a Volume Group's metadata on all the other nodes.

(8) Instruct clvmd to report the cluster name.

(9) Instruct clvmd to echo back the command it received.

(10) Instruct clvmd to refresh its internal caches.

Several of these involve performing privileged operations and could impact upon service availability on machines belonging to the cluster.

The fix ======= We are reverting to using a pathname for the socket and relying upon standard filesystem security.

LibTIFF in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 3 on x8664 platforms, as used in tiff2rgba, attempts to process image data even when the required compression functionality is not configured, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted TIFF image, related to "downsampled OJPEG input."