It was discovered that IcedTea-Web browser plugin incorrectly used the same class loader for applets with the same codebase paths. The default and commonly used codebase value is ".". A malicious applet could use this flaw to gain information about or possibly manipulate other applets currently running in the browser. This could possibly lead to malicious applet's code being executed as part of the other applet.

Current IcedTea-Web versions are affected by GIFAR issue. It is possible to combine GIF image with Java JAR into a single file, that is both valid GIF as well as valid JAR/ZIP file. This issue can be used to execute Java applet in the context of the site that allows untrusted users to upload images in GIF format.

This problem was previously fixed in Oracle and IBM Java plugins as CVE-2008-5343 (bug 474790).

References: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifar http://xs-sniper.com/blog/2008/12/17/sun-fixes-gifars/ http://riosec.com/how-to-create-a-gifar

A flaw was reported in IcedTea-web plugin where certain events attached to an applet, when triggered, could lead to a heap-based buffer overflow, resulting in possible information leak, crash, or code execution.

Deepak Bhole discovered a flaw in the Same Origin Policy (SOP) implementation in the IcedTea project Web browser plugin. A malicious applet could use this flaw to bypass SOP protection and open connections to any sub-domain of the second-level domain of the applet's origin, as well as any sub-domain of the domain that is the suffix of the origin second-level domain. For example, IcedTea-Web plugin allowed applet from some.host.example.com to connect to other.host.example.com, www.example.com, and example.com, as well as www.ample.com or ample.com.

The JNLPClassLoader class in IcedTea-Web before 1.0.1, as used in OpenJDK Runtime Environment 1.6.0, allows remote attackers to gain privileges via unknown vectors related to multiple signers and the assignment of "an inappropriate security descriptor."