cartridgerepository.rb in OpenShift Origin and Enterprise 1.2.8 through 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in a Source-Url ending with a (1) .tar.gz, (2) .zip, (3) .tgz, or (4) .tar file extension in a cartridge manifest file.

rubygem-openshift-origin-controller: API can be used to create applications via cartridgecache.rb URI.prase() to perform command injection

It was reported that by creating a new image with root password changed and using it as a sti builder image, attackers are able to gain ROOT in it. Overridding builder image scripts(e.g. assemble) can help the attackers to access the pod and/or perform remote command execution in it.

Product bugs (contain reproducer):

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/showbug.cgi?id=1315187 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/showbug.cgi?id=1315188

Upstream bug:

https://github.com/openshift/origin/pull/7864

Michael Scherer (mscherer) reports:

the file https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/node-util/www/html/restorer.php used to restore application after being idle fails to safely handle user supplied data that is later used on the command line.

OpenShift Origin: Improperly validated team names could allow stored XSS attacks

Michael Scherer (mscherer) reports:

the file https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/node-util/www/html/restorer.php used to restore application after being idle fails to safely handle user supplied data that is later used in the HTTP headers for the Location: value which can then result in request redirection to an arbitrary page.

Ruby gem openshift-origin-node before 2014-02-14 does not contain a cronjob timeout which could result in a denial of service in cron.daily and cron.weekly.

In Openshift Origin 3 the cookies being set in console have no 'secure', 'HttpOnly' attributes.

openshift-node in OpenShift Origin 1.1.6 and earlier improperly stores router credentials as envvars in the pod when the --credentials option is used, which allows local users to obtain sensitive private key information by reading the systemd journal.

Kubernetes api server: build config to a strategy that isn't allowed by policy

External reference: https://github.com/openshift/origin/issues/6556 https://github.com/openshift/origin/pull/6576

Jordan Liggitt of the Red Hat OpenShift Team reports:

Malformed JSON can cause the OpenShift Master/Broker to exit unexpectedly.

External References: https://github.com/openshift/origin/issues/4374

Acknowledgement:

Red Hat would like to thank Jordan Liggitt of the Red Hat OpenShift Team for reporting this issue.

Michael Scherer (misc) of Red Hat reports:

Looking at a recent git checkout of openshift, I found that some script use a hardcoded or easy to guess filename in /tmp, in this case : https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/port-proxy/bin/openshift-port-proxy-cfg#L13

I am not sure this can be exploited, but after searching a while, here is a credible attack.

This filename is used on https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/port-proxy/bin/openshift-port-proxy-cfg#L144

While it took me a while to figure what the code of lockwrap does exactly, I found out there is a small windows of time between "we check the file exist and is empty" and "we write 0 or a return code to the file".

Let's imagine the following scenario, some attacker has shell access to the server that run this ( ie, a openshift node if I am not wrong ). People have access to the node, at least on openshift-online and this is required to push with git the code ( unless setup otherwise ).

This attacker create 5000 empty files who match the pattern /tmp/openshift-port-proxy-reload.req.????? ( and this could be something else than numbers, like .aaaaa ). Then he wait, and 1 second after, erase it and replace it by a link to another arbitrary file. Doing it with the 5000 files and a proper timing ( like waiting 1/5000 second between each file operation ) would make sure that if a operation check a file and then 1 second later, write to the file, this would not be the same for at least 1 of them. ( at least, that's my understanding, timing may be harder to get right on a real computer with enough ram, cpu and fast disk than the one I imagined ). Another variant would be to use something that is triggered when stat is run, but inotify cannot be used, and audit subsystem requires root.

Then, if someone else run the script and enter the function lockwrap that reload the proxy, it would first do a stat to check the file is empty (https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/port-proxy/bin/openshift-port-proxy-cfg#L152) then reload the proxy ( and check all others file with stat before ), and there is a non negligeable chance that the script would write the return code in a different file ( ie, if that's a link, write it somewhere else ), since it write on all files matching the pattern, and not only the one created by mkstemp.

Depending on the kernel configuration and installation, this can be mitigated ( openshift online use polyinstanciation of /tmp, for example, newer kernel ship the yama module, for another example ). But in the most favourable case for the attacker ( ie no protection ), this mean he can create a file in a arbitray location with a content of 0 or 1.

The script is executed as root , as part as the user creation : https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/node/lib/openshift-origin-node/model/unixuser.rb#L87 , function create, just after running useradd command ( hence the assumption this is run as root )

that function call initializeopenshiftportproxy https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/node/lib/openshift-origin-node/model/unixuser.rb#L139

that run the command "openshift-port-proxy-cfg setproxy" https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/node/lib/openshift-origin-node/model/unixuser.rb#L583

that then that script run the function lockwrap : https://github.com/openshift/origin-server/blob/master/port-proxy/bin/openshift-port-proxy-cfg#L263

and then lockwrap trigger the problem described before.

So a attacker could just create and remove several application until the attack succeed, ie, bruteforce it and make a 0 or 1 be written in a arbitrary location as root ( if selinux, polyinstanciation etc are disabled ).

openshift-origin-port-proxy is part of the entreprise release version 1, IIRC, of F18 and rawhide.

So I think this will requires a errata and a CVE if I am not wrong on my analysis of the problem. The issue was not discussed with anyone explicitely (I just discussed about the code on #fedora-devel on irc.freenode.net with 2 others fedora packagers but the exact issue was not disclosed ).

HAproxy in Red Hat OpenShift Enterprise 3.2 and OpenShift Origin allows local users to obtain the internal IP address of a pod by reading the "OPENSHIFT[namespace]SERVERID" cookie.

It is reported that the rhc-chk command when run with the -d displays the password in cleartext.