By using a specially crafted HTTP request, the authentication of the jmx-console can be bypassed, as the access restrictions only apply for GET and POST.

Current setting is:

<security-constraint> <web-resource-collection> <web-resource-name>HtmlAdaptor</web-resource-name> <description>An example security config that only allows users with the role JBossAdmin to access the HTML JMX console web application </description> <url-pattern>/</url-pattern> <http-method>GET</http-method> <http-method>POST</http-method> </web-resource-collection> <auth-constraint> <role-name>JBossAdmin</role-name> </auth-constraint> </security-constraint>

and should be changed to block ALL http-methods.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Stefano Di Paola and Giorgio Fedon of Minded Security for responsibly reporting this issue.

A flaw was found in JBoss Enterprise Application Platform. The processInvocation function within the org.jboss.as.ejb3.security.AuthorizationInterceptor component incorrectly authorizes all requests when no roles are defined for an Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) method invocation. This allows attackers to bypass intended access restrictions for EJB methods, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive functionalities.

Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform (aka JBoss EAP or JBEAP) 4.2 before 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3 before 4.3.0.CP08 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information about "deployed web contexts" via a request to the status servlet, as demonstrated by a full=true query string. NOTE: this issue exists because of a CVE-2008-3273 regression.