dom4j could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by improper input validation in multiple methods. By sending a specially-crafted XML content, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system.
A flaw was found in the way Apache CXF handle exceptions when CXF is configured to use the com.sun.net.ssl implementation via System.setProperty("java.protocol.handler.pkgs", "com.sun.net.ssl.internal.www.protocol") function. When this system property is set, CXF uses some reflection to try to make the HostnameVerifier work with the old com.sun.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier interface. However, the default HostnameVerifier implementation in CXF does not implement the method in this interface therefore an exception is thrown. The exception is caught in the reflection code but not properly propagated which leaves CXF client subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Upstream Patch: https://github.com/apache/cxf/commit/fae6fabf9bd7647f5e9cb68897a7d7
Bouncy Castle BC 1.54 - 1.59, BC-FJA 1.0.0, BC-FJA 1.0.1 and earlier have a flaw in the Low-level interface to RSA key pair generator, specifically RSA Key Pairs generated in low-level API with added certainty may have less M-R tests than expected. This appears to be fixed in versions BC 1.60 beta 4 and later, BC-FJA 1.0.2 and later.
An issue was found in the Artemis and HornetQ .When 3rd party tool send multicast messages to Artemis/HornetQ which is configured with UDP Disovery and JGroups Discovery, Artemis/HornetQ creates a huge byte array at receiving the unexpected multicast message. So, it results in heap memory exhaustion, full GC and OutOfMemoryError in the worst case.
It was discovered that Undertow before 1.4.17, 1.3.31 and 2.0.0 processes http request headers with unusual whitespaces which can cause possible http request smuggling.
A class implementing the Serializable interface is free to implement the “readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in)” method however it chooses. This readObject method is used during the deserialization process, when constructing a java object from a serialized byte stream. It is possible to implement the method in such a way that can result in java code being executed during the deserialization of an object of this class (gadget class).
The JMS specification outlines a getObject() method on the javax.jms.ObjectMessage class. The Apache Artemis implementation of this method allows deserialization of objects, from untrusted input. There are several places where Apache Artemis uses this getObject() method. In the JMS Core client, the Artemis broker and the Artemis REST component. These Artemis components may therefore be vulnerable to a remote code execution attack. Successful exploitations of this vulnerability rely on these "gadget classes" being present on the Artemis classpath and the sender of the untrusted input being authenticated and authorized to send messages to the Artemis broker.
It was discovered that the jboss init script performed unsafe file handling which could result in local privilege escalation.