A use-after-free vulnerability was found in the Go GPGME wrapper library, github.com/proglottis/gpgme. An attacker could use this flaw to crash or cause potential code execution in Go applications that use this library, under certain conditions, during GPG signature verification.
An insecure modification vulnerability in the /etc/passwd file was found in the container openshift/mysql-apb. An attacker with access to the container could use this flaw to modify /etc/passwd and escalate their privileges.
It has been found that in openshift-enterprise version 3.11 and openshift-enterprise versions 4.1 up to, including 4.3, multiple containers modify the permissions of /etc/passwd to make them modifiable by users other than root. An attacker with access to the running container can exploit this to modify /etc/passwd to add a user and escalate their privileges. This CVE is specific to the openshift/apb-tools-container.
An out of bounds write flaw was found in the SQLite component of the Chromium browser.
Upstream bug(s):
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1025466
External References:
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2019/12/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html
A flaw was found in computer hardware of the Intel microprocessors related to the instruction-side TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer) that caches translations from guest (and host) virtual addresses into physical addresses.
This is a software fix that attempts to prevent exploitation of the hardware through preventing a hacker from creating an exploitable condition
Additional information:
https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/ifu-page-mce
A flaw was found in HTTP/2. Using HEADER frames with invalid HTTP headers and queuing of response RSTSTREAM frames, an attacker could cause a flood resulting in unbounded memory growth. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.
As announced by Go upstream on 2019-09-25: net/http (through net/textproto) used to accept and normalize invalid HTTP/1.1 headers with a space before the colon, in violation of RFC 7230. If a Go server is used behind an uncommon reverse proxy that accepts and forwards but doesn't normalize such invalid headers, the reverse proxy and the server can interpret the headers differently. This can lead to filter bypasses or request smuggling, the latter if requests from separate clients are multiplexed onto the same upstream connection by the proxy. Such invalid headers are now rejected by Go servers, and passed without normalization to Go client applications
Reference: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/34540
Impact By crafting a malicious root filesystem (with /proc being a symlink to a directory which was inside a volume shared with another running container), an attacker in control of both containers can trick runc into not correctly configuring the container's security labels and not correctly masking paths inside /proc which contain potentially-sensitive information about the host (or even allow for direct attacks against the host).
In order to exploit this bug, an untrusted user must be able to spawn custom containers with custom mount configurations (such that a volume is shared between two containers). It should be noted that we consider this to be a fairly high level of access for an untrusted user -- and we do not recommend allowing completely untrusted users to have such degrees of access without further restrictions.
Specific Go Package Affected github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer
Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in 1.0.0-rc10. It should be noted that the current fix is effectively a hot-fix, and there are known ways for it to be worked around (such as making the entire root filesystem a shared volume controlled by another container). We recommend that users review their access policies to ensure that untrusted users do not have such high levels of controls over container mount configuration.
Workarounds If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to configure mountpoints for runc (or through a higher-level tool such as docker run -v) then you are not vulnerable to this issue. This exploit requires fairly complicated levels of access (which are available for some public clouds but are not necessarily available for all deployments).
Additionally, it appears as though it is not possible to exploit this vulnerability through Docker (due to the order of mounts Docker generates). However you should not depend on this, as it may be possible to work around this roadblock.
Credits This vulnerability was discovered by Cure53, as part of a third-party security audit.
For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue. Email us at dev@opencontainers.org, or security@opencontainers.org if you think you've found a security bug.
Last updated 25 August 2025