Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to block the slf4j-ext class from polymorphic deserialization.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to block the blaze-ds-opt and blaze-ds-core classes from polymorphic deserialization.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A privilege escalation flaw was found in OpenShift builder. During build time, credentials outside the build context are automatically mounted into the container image under construction. An OpenShift user, able to execute code during build time inside this container can re-use the credentials to overwrite arbitrary container images in internal registries and/or escalate their privileges. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in the Java logging library Apache Log4j in version 1.x . This allows a remote attacker to execute code on the server if the deployed application is configured to use JMSAppender.

In 1.x you will find that there are two places where lookups are done - that is JMSAppender.java:207 and JMSAppender.java:222 - if you set TopicBindingName or TopicConnectionFactoryBindingName to something that JNDI can handle - for example "ldap://host:port/a" JNDI will do exactly the same thing it does for 2.x - so 1.x is vulnerable, just attack vector is "safer" as it depends on configuration rather than user input

This flaw in Log4j 2.x is tracked via CVE-2021-44228

1 / 4
Source: Red Hat

Remedy

These are the possible mitigations for this flaw for releases version 1.x: - Comment out or remove JMSAppender in the Log4j configuration if it is used - Remove the JMSAppender class from the classpath. For example: ``` zip -q -d log4j-*.jar org/apache/log4j/net/JMSAppender.class ``` - Restrict access for the OS user on the platform running the application to prevent modifying the Log4j configuration by the attacker.
First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. Measuring usage of the shared memory does not scale with large shared memory segment counts which could lead to resource exhaustion and DoS.

1 / 3

Remedy

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options does not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
Race Condition, Use After Free
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

.A flaw was found in the CAN BCM networking protocol in the Linux kernel, where a local attacker can abuse a flaw in the CAN subsystem to corrupt memory, crash the system or escalate privileges. This race condition in net/can/bcm.c in the Linux kernel allows for local privilege escalation to root.

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Remedy

As the CAN module will be auto-loaded when required, its use can be disabled by preventing the module from loading with the following instructions: # echo "install can-bcm /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/disable-can-bcm.conf The system will need to be restarted if the CAN modules are loaded. In most circumstances, the CAN kernel modules will be unable to be unloaded while any network interfaces are active and the protocol is in use. If the system requires this module to work correctly, this mitigation may not be suitable. If you need further assistance, see KCS article https://access.redhat.com/solutions/41278 or contact Red Hat Global Support Services.
First published (updated )

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