n authorization flaw in Foreman's GraphQL API allows low-privileged users to access metadata beyond their assigned permissions. Unlike the REST API, which correctly enforces access controls, the GraphQL endpoint does not apply proper filtering, leading to an authorization bypass.

A flaw was found in foreman. Authenticated users with 'viewkeypairs' permission can bypass taxonomy scoping, allowing them to download private SSH (Secure Shell) keys from other organizations by directly querying key pair IDs. This vulnerability leads to cross-tenant data exposure in multi-tenant deployments, potentially compromising sensitive information.

A broken access control flaw was found in Foreman. This flaw allows an authenticated user with host-edit permissions to retarget an existing lookup value override to a different host by modifying the match field via nested host attributes, bypassing authorization checks. The injected values are served by the ENC/classification pipeline to configuration management tools, potentially resulting in unauthorized modification of managed host configurations across organization and location boundaries.

Authenticated Foreman account with edit rights on at least one host (edithosts permission). The attacker needs two requests: first to create a legitimate override on their own host, then to retarget its match field to the victim host's FQDN. A lookup key with fqdn in its path must exist.

A flaw was found in Foreman. An authenticated user with host-edit permissions could exploit a cross-tenant information disclosure vulnerability. This flaw occurs because the taxonomyscope controller method does not properly validate organization and location IDs from nested request parameters, bypassing existing authorization checks. This allows the user to leak sensitive infrastructure metadata, including subnet topology, IP ranges, gateways, DNS servers, and VLAN IDs, from organizations and locations they are not authorized to access.