The kernel in Samsung Galaxy S2, Galaxy Note 2, MEIZU MX, and possibly other Android devices, when running an Exynos 4210 or 4412 processor, uses weak permissions (0666) for /dev/exynos-mem, which allows attackers to read or write arbitrary physical memory and gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by ExynosAbuse.
Samsung Galaxy S8 plus (Android version: 8.0.0, Build Number: R16NW.G955USQU5CRG3, Baseband Vendor: Qualcomm Snapdragon 835, Baseband: G955USQU5CRG3), Samsung Galaxy S3 (Android version: 4.3, Build Number: JSS15J.I9300XXUGND5, Baseband Vendor: Samsung Exynos 4412, Baseband: I9300XXUGNA8), and Samsung Galaxy Note 2 (Android version: 4.3, Build Number: JSS15J.I9300XUGND5, Baseband Vendor: Samsung Exynos 4412, Baseband: N7100DDUFND1) devices allow injection of AT+CIMI and AT+CGSN over Bluetooth, leaking sensitive information such as IMSI, IMEI, call status, call setup stage, internet service status, signal strength, current roaming status, battery level, and call held status.
Samsung Galaxy S8 plus (Android version: 8.0.0, Build Number: R16NW.G955USQU5CRG3, Baseband Vendor: Qualcomm Snapdragon 835, Baseband: G955USQU5CRG3), Samsung Galaxy S3 (Android version: 4.3, Build Number: JSS15J.I9300XXUGND5, Baseband Vendor: Samsung Exynos 4412, Baseband: I9300XXUGNA8), and Samsung Galaxy Note 2 (Android version: 4.3, Build Number: JSS15J.I9300XUGND5, Baseband Vendor: Samsung Exynos 4412, Baseband: N7100DDUFND1) devices allow attackers to send AT commands over Bluetooth, resulting in several Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
The Track My Mobile feature in the SamsungDive subsystem for Android on Samsung Galaxy devices shows the activation of remote tracking, which might allow physically proximate attackers to defeat a product-recovery effort by tampering with this feature or its location data.
The Track My Mobile feature in the SamsungDive subsystem for Android on Samsung Galaxy devices does not properly implement Location APIs, which allows physically proximate attackers to provide arbitrary location data via a "commonly available simple GPS location spoofer."