On some Samsung phones and tablets running Android through 7.1.1, it is possible for an attacker-controlled Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) device to pair silently with a vulnerable target device, without any user interaction, when the target device's Bluetooth is on, and it is running an app that offers a connectable BLE advertisement. An example of such an app could be a Bluetooth-based contact tracing app, such as Australia's COVIDSafe app, Singapore's TraceTogether app, or France's TousAntiCovid (formerly StopCovid). As part of the pairing process, two pieces (among others) of personally identifiable information are exchanged: the Identity Address of the Bluetooth adapter of the target device, and its associated Identity Resolving Key (IRK). Either one of these identifiers can be used to perform re-identification of the target device for long term tracking. The list of affected devices includes (but is not limited to): Galaxy Note 5, Galaxy S6 Edge, Galaxy A3, Tab A (2017), J2 Pro (2018), Galaxy Note 4, and Galaxy S5.

An issue was discovered on Samsung mobile devices with N(7.x) and O(8.0) (Galaxy S9+, Galaxy S9, Galaxy S8+, Galaxy S8, Note 8). There is access to Clipboard content in the locked state via the Edge panel. The Samsung ID is SVE-2017-10748 (May 2018).

An issue was discovered on Samsung mobile devices with P(9.0) (Galaxy S8 and Note8) software. Facial recognition can be spoofed. The Samsung ID is SVE-2019-16614 (February 2020).

Bluetooth. An issue existed with the use of a PRNG with low entropy. This issue was addressed with improved state management.

On Samsung mobile devices with O(8.0) and P(9.0) software and an Exynos 8895 chipset, RKP (aka the Samsung Hypervisor EL2 implementation) allows arbitrary memory write operations. The Samsung ID is SVE-2019-16265.